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This report provides a state of the art of existing research on active civic participation of 
immigrants in Belgium. The report is divided in three parts. The first is an overview of the 
general condition of Belgium as an immigration country. The history of migration movements 
in the post-war era is presented alongside a description of the current foreign population in the 
country. Being a linguistically divided country, the report explains how this cleavage has been 
central in defining two divergent types of attitudes and reaction to the inflow and settlement 
of immigrants. While the Flemish speaking community has pursued a multiculturalist policy 
influenced by Dutch and anglo-american ideas, the French speaking community has opted for 
a less specific approach more in line with French republican assimilationism. The point is 
however that, in comparison to other European immigration countries, both the Flemish and 
French speaking communities have started devising immigrant policies quite belatedly. Until 
1989 and the first electoral breakthrough of the extreme-right in Flanders, the political 
establishment at the national federal level had turned a blind eye to this issue, assuming that 
immigration was a temporary phenomenon. 
The second part of the report looks more specifically at the notion of active civic participation 
by providing a review of existing academic research. The reports looks at the various facets of 
active civic participation and takes a broad view on the subject. Considering the increasing 
involvement of immigrants in electoral politics, a large discussion is provided on the issue of 
political participation. A special account is given to the local election of October 2000 which 
saw a remarkable breakthrough of immigrant politicians in Brussels. This development has 
been facilitated, among others, by the very broad opening of the nationality legislation. On 
both these aspects (i.e. nationality laws and political representation of immigrants), Belgium 
has become an exceptional, and quite advanced, case in Europe.  
There are however a number of other areas where immigrants have been actively involved in 
Belgian public life. Since the seventies, immigrants have the right to vote and stand as 
candidates in so-called social elections (i.e. for worker councils). No specific research has 
been achieved on the extent of immigrant participation in workers participatory institutions, 
but it is generally considered to be important. The model of voting rights in private companies 
has served since it was put in place as an example to extend to the arena of local politics. 
Trade unions, for instance, have pleaded for the local enfranchisement of immigrant workers 
since the seventies. This has resulted only in 2004 in a decision to allow non European 
citizens to participate (only as voters and not as candidates).  
Among younger waves of immigration, especially among those originating from the Muslim 
world, Islam is becoming the language through which participation is increasingly sought. A 
review is proposed of the rise of Islamic parties in Brussels and Antwerp and a discussion is 
proposed of the peculiar relationship established by the Belgian State with a number of 
institutionnaly recognised religions (including Islam). Belgium has indeed implemented a 
unique system allowing Muslims to select their representatives before the State through a 
nation-wide general election.  
As in many other immigration countries, participation through voluntary associations remains 
an important avenue of public and civic involvement. The report discusses the results of a 
large survey in Brussels based on a representative sample of Moroccans, Turks and low 
educated Belgians. Several important findings are presented concerning the relationship 
between associational membership and political involvement.  
By way of conclusion, we propose in the final part of the report an expert assessment on the 
knowledge produced by Belgian academic research on the notion of active civic participation.  
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Part I: Understanding the conditions for immigrant 
participation 
 
1. Key events and demographic developments in the migration history of 
Belgium 
 
During the last months of the Second World War and immediately after the German defeat, 
the Belgian government made a priority of revitalising the exploitation of the Belgian coal 
mines in order to rebuild Belgian economy. The mining sector was seen to be so crucial in 
rebuilding the country, that the government even used war rhetoric to underline the strategic 
importance of coal for the Belgian economy. The revitalisation of the coal mines was said to 
be no less than a ‘battle of coal’. Despite an improvement of working conditions, the 
introduction of a special (favourable) social-legal status of miners and compulsory 
reintegration of former Belgian miners (Lewin, 1997: 20), the government was still 
confronted with a shortage of miners. As a result, from May 1945 onwards, German prisoners 
of war were forced to go and work in the mines. In January 1946 nearly 46,000 German 
POW's worked in the mines. Anticipating the release of the German POW’s (in May 1947), 
the Belgian government started negotiations with the Italian government in order to 
systematically recruit workers to be employed in the mines (Martens, 1973: 161). In June 
1946 the Belgian government made a deal with the Italian government to exchange Italian 
guest workers for a set amount of its coal production to be sold to Italy. As a result of the 
bilateral agreement, every week 2,000 (new) Italian workers would be transferred from 
Milano to Belgium by train. The majority was recruited from Northern-Italy and attempts 
were made to prevent ‘undesirable’ political elements – i.e. communists – of joining the 
foreign Italian labour force in Belgium (Morelli, 1992: 202). In spite of prior promises, the 
foreign labourers encountered rather harsh working and housing conditions. In the period 
1946-1949, over 77,000 Italian workers would arrive through active recruitment in Belgium 
(Martens, 1973: 163), of whom the large majority were to be employed in Wallonia. 
Sustained foreign recruitment was necessary given the fairly high drop out rates of the miners 
(Martens, 1973: 102). In addition to the Italian workers, the management of the coal mines 
recruited over 23,000 new miners amongst the Eastern-European ‘displaced persons’ in 
occupied Western-German territory in order to counter the shortages of labour resulting from 
the return of the German POW’s. 
 
In 1949-1950 foreign recruitment was shortly put to a halt, as the result of a cyclical recession 
and pressure from the trade unions. It would be taken up again in 1951. Between 1951 and 
1953 in total over 44,000 (new) Italians were attracted to the Belgian – mainly Walloon - 
mines (Martens, 1986: 101). In the period 1952-1955 foreign recruitment was in principle 
again put to a halt - although there was some lenience for the mines in 1952 and 1953 -, to be 
reinstalled in May 1955. In the period 1955-1957 over 20,000 Italian miners came to 
Belgium. After 1955, foreign recruitment of labourers would no longer be limited to the coal 
mines, but was gradually extended to the steal industry and the construction sector. In 
addition, foreign miners increasingly sought (and found) new employment in these other 
sectors, what in turn led to a new need for other (foreign) miners. 
  
In February 1956 a mining accident at Quaregnon caused the death of 7 Italian miners. In 
August 1956 a mining accident at Marcinelle caused the death of 262 miners, of whom 136 
were Italian. These incidents prompted Italy to demand better working conditions for the 
Italian guest workers in Belgium. Given the security related demands of the Italian 
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government, Belgium decided to turn more actively to other countries to recruit foreign 
workers (Morelli, 1992: 206; Lewin, 1997: 22).  
 
As an indirect consequence of the disasters at Quaregnon and Marcinelle and prompted by the 
new Italian demands regarding security, Belgium increasingly turned to other countries to 
attract blue-collar workers (especially miners). Up to that point, Italian immigration had 
clearly been the most important segment of the total immigration to Belgium: between 1948 
and 1958 on average 48.5% of immigration to Belgium had originated from Italy (Grimeau, 
1993: 118). At the end of the fifties, and especially in the course of the sixties, the 
composition of migration flows to Belgium would become more diversified, amongst other 
factors due to the signing of new bilateral agreements with other Mediterranean countries. 
After already having attracted 5,000 workers from these countries in 1955-1956, in November 
1956 a first new bilateral agreement was signed with Spain and in August 1957 an 
arrangement was made with Greece. These agreements ensured the recruitment of about 
12,000 workers in 1957 (Martens, 1973: 210). Due to cyclical recession, the closing of some 
mines in accordance with the CECE-agreement and pressure of the trade unions in the mining 
sector, foreign recruitment was put to a halt from 1958 to 1961. In 1962, however, foreign 
recruitment was reinstalled because several sectors of industry experienced a shortage of low 
skilled labourers. Due to competition for foreign labourers with the neighbouring countries, 
Belgium was forced to further expand its area of recruitment. In 1964 bilateral agreements 
were thus made with Morocco and Turkey. In 1969 and 1970 bilateral agreements were made 
with Tunisia and Algeria. The largest group of immigrant low skilled labourers to settle in 
Belgium in the sixties undoubtedly came from Morocco. It is important to note that these 
Moroccan guest workers – just like other foreign workers - were explicitly invited to bring 
their families along (Atar, 1993: 302). A large majority of them settled in the major cities and 
especially in Brussels. From 1962 to 1965 – ‘the golden sixties’ - over 125,000 working 
permits were granted to foreigners. In the entire period 1956-1967 a total of 214,454 working 
permits (for new immigrants) had been granted (Martens, 1973: 105). Between 1962 and 1971 
in total more than 544,000 foreigners came to Belgium, while 260,000 foreigners emigrated 
during the same period, resulting in a migration surplus of 284,000 foreigners (Martens, 1973: 
50). The effects of the large scale recruitment of foreign labourers (combined with the advent 
of families of those staying in Belgium and birth on Belgian soil of immigrant children) on 
the proportion of foreigners in the total population were quite considerable. The foreign 
population increased from 379,528 in 1954 to 716,237 - over 7% of the total population - in 
1970 (Martens, 1973: 47). In the sixties, a considerable amount of the new immigrants were 
non-active dependants of guest workers (Lewin, 1997: 23). Immigration of dependants 
(through family reunion) was indeed even actively stimulated in the sixties, resulting out of 
the wish of Walloon politicians to use immigration for demographic purposes (Sauvy, 1962; 
Martens, 1973: 235-236; Lewin, 1997: 23) and in order to compete with neighbouring 
countries trying to attract foreign labourers (Martens, 1973: 107). 
   
Due to economic recession, the decision was made by the Belgian government in August 
1974 to stop all new immigration and active recruitment of non-EC guest workers. However, 
for certain categories of specialised workers (for instance Polish mechanics) an exception was 
made to this general rule. The policy change did not lead to a complete halt of legal non-EC 
migration flows to Belgium. The government still allowed for family reunion of non-EC-
immigrants, partly as a consequence of demographic problems in Wallonia (ageing of the 
population). Nevertheless, within the migration flows to Belgium, EC-immigration, and 
especially immigration from the neighbouring countries, gained momentum. While the 
neighbouring countries and the UK had accounted for 24% of immigration to Belgium in the 
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period 1962-1966, they would account for 36% of immigration to Belgium in the period 
1967-1982 (Grimeau, 1993: 119). 
    
Before turning to a short discussion of migration flows in the nineties, it is important to note 
that Belgium, a former colonial power in Central Africa (Congo, Ruanda, Burundi), never 
opted for recruiting colonial labourers. The main for that is the need to preserve a sufficient 
workforce for colonial exploitation in Africa. On that specific point, the Belgian attitude 
diverged from most of its neighbours.  
 
After 1974, immigration of EC-citizens (for instance in 1991 involving 24,855 persons) was 
fairly stable (in comparison to earlier levels) and remained more important than EC-
emigration (for instance in 1991 officially involving 12,521 persons), with an exception for 
Italians, Spaniards and Greeks who seem to be involved in forms of return migration. As far 
as non-EU-citizens are concerned, it can be noted that at the end of the eighties, a ‘new’ 
category of immigrants came to the foreground, consisting of asylum seekers. Migration of 
political refugees to Belgium was by no means a new phenomenon, but  clearly one which 
gained importance in the overall migration flows at the end of the eighties and throughout the 
nineties - and increasingly became the object of political debate (See Figure 1). It should be 
noted, however, that in the post Cold War period after 1989 it was (and is) increasingly 
difficult to differentiate between ‘economic migrants’ and ‘political refugees’. In addition, it 
should be stressed that only figures are at hand of refugees applying for asylum (in 
accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention) and that there is no clear view on 
undocumented refugees (or other undocumented immigrants). Moreover, it is extremely 
difficult – if not impossible – to precisely know how many applicants of whom the asylum 
demand was rejected, actually left (or were expelled out of) the country or remained in the 
country with an irregular or semi-irregular status. The refugees who applied for (official) 
asylum mainly originated from Eastern Europe, from African countries and Asia. Although 
the asylum seekers came from over 113 different countries, a majority originated from 
particular countries (or regions): ex-Yugoslavia, ex-USSR, Rumania, Congo (former Zaire), 
Pakistan, Nigeria, Bulgaria, Turkey and Ghana. Over the years, the number of asylum seekers 
from Eastern European countries had become increasingly important. In 1996, 54.8% of the 
asylum seekers originated from Europe (former-Yugoslavia, other Eastern-European countries 
and the former-USSR), 28% originated from Africa (of which the Congolese with 6.9% 
constitute the largest group) and 11% originated from Asia (mainly Turkey and Pakistan). 
Former-Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Serbia, Kosova, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia en Macedonia) 
in 1996 accounted for almost a fourth of all asylum seekers.  
 
Table 1. Foreign population in Belgium on January 1st (1999-2004) per Regions 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 891.980 897.110 861.685 846.734 850.077 860.287 
Brussels 272.146 273.613 262.771 260.040 260.269 263.451 
Flanders 289.065 293.650 280.962 275.223 280.743 288.375 
Wallonia 330.769 329.847 317.952 311.471 309.065 308.461 
Source: Institut National de la Statistique (INS) 
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Table 2 Foreign population in Belgium on January 1st 2002 per groups of nationalities 
    
Nationality Absolute % total pop % foreigners 
EU 576.621 5,59% 68,1% 
Non EU 270.113 2,62% 31,9% 
Total foreigners 846.734 8,1% 100% 
Belgians 9.462.991 91,79% / 
Total population 10.309.725 100% / 
Source : http://www.antiracisme.be/fr/cadre_fr.htm 
 
 
Figure 1: The evolution of the number of asylum seekers between 1998 and 2003 
 
Source : http://www.antiracisme.be/fr/cadre_fr.htm 
 
 
Table 3. Foreigners acquiring Belgian nationality (1994-2003) 











Source: ECODATA, Federal Ministry for Economy 
 
Of the three regions in Belgium (Flanders, Brussels and Walloonia), the Region of Brussels-
Capital is in proportional terms hosting the largest number of foreign residents (close to 30 
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per cent). European and non European citizens account for more or less similar shares of 15 
per cent of the population. It can be noted that fifty percent of the non-EU citizens in Brussels 
are Moroccans. 
 
It is unknown how many children of foreign residents in Brussels acquired Belgian nationality 
due to the introduction of ius soli in 1985 (and its extension in 1991) (See further). We do 
know that in the Census of 1991, 53,983 Belgian persons did not have Belgian nationality at 
the time of birth (and hence made use of the naturalisation procedure). As a result, we know 
that at least 34.1 per cent of the inhabitants of Brussels was of foreign origin in 1991. It may 
be noted that Belgium throughout the nineties liberalized its nationality legislation, to the 
extent that the country as a result has one of the most open legislations in the world (See 
further). One can apply for naturalization after three years of residence, while seven years of 
legal residence gives the right to semi-automatic access to Belgian citizenship. Due to the 
evolution of the nationality legislation and demographic developments, in 2005 probably 
around 10 per cent of the Brussels population are Belgians of foreign descent (who acquired 
citizenship through ius soli, naturalisation or the other systems for acquiring Belgian 
nationality). One can thus estimate that today approximately 40 per cent of the inhabitants of 
Brussels is of immigrant – non-Belgian - origin.  
 
 
2. Major issues discussed with relation to immigration and active civic 
participation 
 
One of the consequences of 9/11 in Belgium is without any doubt that the issue of 
multiculturalism and the position of Islam within Belgian society has been put centre stage in 
political and public debate. Any observer who would undertake a quick scan of the focus of 
contemporary Belgian media attention would have to conclude that the issue of cultural 
diversity – and in particular the position of immigrant Muslim minority groups - is currently 
seen to be standing at the heart of public life. The preoccupation of managing ethnic, cultural 
and religious diversity in the public space did not bluntly appear with the tragic events in New 
York and Washington. Indeed, it has been a recurring issue for – albeit fragmented - debate in 
Belgium ever since the mid seventies (Jacobs & Swyngedouw, 2002).  
  
What is new in the content of the debate, however, is the peremptory negative character of the 
arguments produced. The most radical opponents to multiculturalism have shaped a space of 
dialogue in which the claim for identity difference and recognition of minority groups is 
deeply questioned. Authoritative arguments vis-à-vis ethnic and religious minorities have 
heavily challenged the discourse and ideal of a society where difference is mutually enriching. 
In many such debates, the incorporation of Islam and Muslims is central, both implicitly as 
explicitly.  
  
In the Belgian context, the question of dealing with ethnic diversity – at least when being 
considered independently from the linguistic divide in the country - was initially conceived as 
an issue limited to handling the consequences of recruitment of a temporary foreign labour 
force in an ad hoc manner. In the course of the seventies and eighties the issue of 
multiculturalism gradually became to be seen independently from issues of migration and 
mobility. If the management of cultural diversity in the public space can today no longer be 
thought in the framework of earlier migration waves alone, it can neither be conceived as a 
matter to be merely dealt with in the private sphere. 
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Fundamentally, the issue at stake is how to conceive a public space able to welcome and 
organise a peaceful coexistence of culturally and religiously different minority and majority 
groups. Such challenge raises the question of the principles along which we need to 
reorganise the public space in an accommodating way for all involved groups. Just like the 
nineteenth century struggles of the working class were articulated in terms of social justice, 
the contemporary claims of minority groups manifesting themselves in multicultural societies 
need to be read as a quest for what political philosophers have called a principle of ethno-
cultural justice (Kymlicka, 2001). 
  
One would wish for a serene climate for pursuing the debate on multiculturalism, but this is 
far from being a readily available condition. These debates are, on the contrary, developing in 
a nervous atmosphere. In Belgium, the context is marked by the fact that the question has 
reached a high level of political centrality, especially in Flanders (the Dutch speaking part of 
Belgium) where the extreme-right wing party Vlaams Blok – which changed its name to 
‘Vlaams Belang’ in November 2004 immediately following a conviction in court for its racist 
propaganda - has obtained no less than 25% of the popular vote in the June 2004 regional and 
general elections. Pushed in the back by a strong xenophobic far-right movement, the 
government and political parties are ceaselessly led to comment and make political statements 
about the perceived failures of multicultural coexistence. By way of consequence, public 
deliberations on the issue of dealing with ethnic diversity take place against a backdrop of 
political manoeuvres seeking to woo either ethnic minority voters - especially in Brussels (see 
Jacobs, Martiniello & Rea, 2002) - or, more often, the anti-multiculturalism and/or 
xenophobic voters (Jacobs & Rummens, 2002). Not surprisingly, the tensions generated by 
international developments also shape the debate. In 2004, the war in Iraq, the Israëli-
Palestinian conflict and the unstable situation in Afghanistan all contributed to a mutual lack 
of confidence between “the West” and “the Arab-Muslim world”. The consequences are not 
merely diplomatic, but equally impact on domestic politics in Belgium as much as in other 
European countries. The relationship between Arab and Muslim minorities on the one hand 
and the majority groups of the European societies where these minorities live and reside on 
the other hand, undergoes the repercussion of these tensions. The worries raised in 
mainstream public opinion by acts of political violence happening in the world in the name of 
Islam raise questions in the open about the nature of European Islam and the degree of loyalty 
of European Muslims. This was only exacerbated in Belgium in November 2004, following 
the murder in Amsterdam of the controversial Dutch cineaste and publicist Theo Van Gogh 
by a young Dutch Muslim extremist of Moroccan origin. 
  
Interestingly, the focus on Islam and the pressure on multicultural discourse in Belgium has, 
however, not directly led to an overall change in actual policy. As has been the case in the 
past, policy is still often of a pragmatic nature and a wide variety of (sometimes contradicting) 
policy practices coexist in Belgium. At some instances a crude assimilationist line is being 
taken, while at other instances ethnic diversity is being stimulated to prosper. Ethnic 
difference can both be neglected and denied or accommodated for, depending on the issue we 
are dealing with and the actors involved. On the ground, policy may be de facto of a 
multicultural nature, while all involved will heavily deny it has anything to do with the idea of 
multiculturalism. Or a strict assimilationist policy scheme may be announced, but in the end 
not at all being implemented so strictly.  
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3. Institutional setting framing immigrant participation 
3.A. General policy framework for immigrant / ethnic minority participation 
 
In Belgium, migration policy (regulation of access to the territory and residence) has always 
been a national prerogative. Integration policy, however, is, by and large, a policy competence 
of the Communities (see Hubeau & Van Put, 1990). However, depending on the policy field 
(labour, education, housing, urban renewal, fight against poverty, etc.) or the region 
concerned (Flanders, Wallonia or Brussels), political authorities from all levels of powers 
have a share in the policies directly or indirectly related to the participation of immigrants and 
ethnic minorities in society.  
 
It should be stressed that the overall framework for any policy regarding immigrants in 
Belgium - whatever institutional level it is stemming from - has been devised in 1989 by the 
Royal Commissariat for Migrant Policies (RCMP).  This semi-official government body, 
attached to the administration of the Prime Minister, was set up in order to develop and 
monitor policy related to the integration of foreigners and ethnic minorities. In 1993, the 
Commissariat was replaced by a permanent institute, the Centre for Equal Opportunities and 
the Fight against Racism (CEOFR), still attached to the administration of the Prime minister.  
 
Of particular importance is the definition of ‘integration’ the Royal Commissariat introduced 
as the pivotal concept for government policies on migrants and ethnic minorities. The second 
element of this official definition of integration targets very specifically the notion of active 
civic participation. Indeed, integration is seen, on the one hand, to be insertion of migrants 
into Belgian society according to three guiding principles: 
 
“(a) assimilation where the ‘public order’ demands this; 
(b) consequent promotion of the best possible fitting in according to the orientating social 
principles which support the culture of the host country and which are related to ‘modernity’, 
‘emancipation’ and ‘true pluralism’ – as understood by a modern western state -; and  
(c) unambiguous respect for the cultural diversity-as-mutual-enrichment in all other areas” 
(KCM, 1989: 38-39). 
 
But, on the other hand, integration entails: 
“promotion of structural involvement of minorities in activities and aims of the government” 
(CRPI, 1989: 39). 
  
The Flemish and Francophone policies towards immigrants and ethnic minorities have all 
taken over the integration framework of the RCM and CEOFR as guidelines for their own 
policy efforts. They have, however, put the stress on other dimensions. The Flemish 
government has had a clear preference for supporting active participation through self-
organisations of migrants which are willing to co-operate in federations and which accept to 
be co-ordinated by quango's. In addition, the Flemish government has financially supported 
local participatory initiatives aimed at urban renewal and integration of deprived groups in 
disfavoured neighbourhoods. In 1998, the Flemish government adopted a new overarching 
policy framework clearly based on the recognition of ethnic-cultural groups and including 
both (settled legal) migrants on the one hand and refugees and groups with nomadic lifestyles 
(‘gypsies’) on the other hand as its target groups.  
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The Francophone and Walloon governments have not been willing to recognise the 
participation of immigrants in society as specific ethnic-cultural groups. Although in practice 
often primarily directed towards immigrant groups, policy initiatives are often framed in such 
a way that immigrants ae not specifically defined as target groups.  The same can be said of 
several measures taken by the Region of Brussels-Capital. The large numbers of foreign 
residents and the de facto residential concentration of ethnic minorities has nevertheless 
forced officials in Brussels towards a more multicultural stance. The Brussels parliament, the 
Flemish Community commission (VGC), the Francophone Community commission 
(COCOF) and the common Community commission (GGC) have thus put forward a special 
Charter, the Charte des devoirs et des droits pour une cohabitation harmonieuse des 
populations bruxelloises, stipulating the ground rules for coexistence of the different groups 
in Brussels. In addition, a 'mixed' consultative commission - 'mixed' since it consisted out of 
an equal number of elected politicians and representatives of immigrant groups - on 
immigrant issues in Brussels was created in 1991 and installed in 1992. The mixed 
commission disposed of a consultative power in issues particularly relevant and/or important 
to the immigrant communities: the issues involved education, employment, housing, living 
conditions, relations with the police, problems associated to non-implementation of laws, 
teaching of Islam religion, local political participation, the rights and the position of women in 
society and refugees. It is worth noting that instead of starting its second term in 1995, the 
mixed commission was split up into one separate Francophone mixed commission and one 
separate Flemish mixed commission.  
 
3.B. Competing Flemish-Francophone approaches towards the participation of 
immigrants in society 
 
Both the Flemish Community Commission (VGC) as the Flemish Community subsidise 
migrant self-organisations in Brussels. To be eligible for funding an organisation has to be 
oriented towards emancipation, education and integration, has to function as a meeting point 
and has to fulfil a cultural function. In addition, the organisation has to operate using (also) 
the Dutch language - if not always, then at least at the executive level. It should be underlined 
that the creation and functioning of 'Flemish' migrant self-organisations is indeed very 
actively stimulated by the Flemish Community Commission and that this has given an 
important energy-boost to immigrant associational life in Brussels. In the second half of the 
nineties, the Flemish Community Commission has even given the organisation Intercultureel 
Centrum voor Migranten (ICCM) the task to co-ordinate and support the 'Flemish' migrant 
self-organisations. The ICCM has, since its creation on 31 March 1993, thus already 
supported a significant number of migrant associations in Brussels. 
  
Substantial efforts were undertaken to ensure good contacts with these and other immigrant 
associations. As an example we can cite the fact that the Flemish authorities invited all 
interested spokespersons of immigrant associations to extraordinary sessions in parliament in 
november and december 1998. In addition, the mixed commission organised a highly 
advertised 'day of dialogue'  in March 1999 - with concerts, free food and drinks - to promote 
the Flemish community among immigrant associations. It is definitely not too far fetched to 
denounce these (and other) activities as - at least partially - strategic attempts of the Flemish 
government in Brussels to incorporate immigrant (often Francophone) self-organisations into 
its policy networks, thus hoping to strengthen the sphere of influence of the Flemish 
community within the Region of Brussels-Capital. Immigrant associations, of course, 
welcome the Flemish efforts as interesting new possibilities for funding and lobbying. The 
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lack of governmental financial support of immigrant organisations had before in an important 
way frustrated the creation of strong immigrant associations and had stimulated incorporation 
of immigrants into existing (Belgian) religious and syndical organisations (Layton-Henry, 
1990). The recent financial support by the (Flemish) government has, in contrast, given a 
boom to immigrant associational life.  
 
3.C. Enfranchisement of foreign residents 
 
Until recently only Belgian citizens were allowed to participate in formal elections. Belgian 
politicians have been remarkably reluctant in enfranchising foreign residents. This was, as we 
have extensively discussed in earlier work (Jacobs, 1998, 1999, 2001), mainly due to 
polarisation and electoral struggle over the anti-immigrant vote in the 1980s and early 1990s 
and to the disruptive effect of the Flemish-Francophone cleavage in the second half of the 
1990s. It took till early 1999 before Belgium finally enfranchised EU-citizens in compliance 
with the Maastricht Treaty and the derived European directive. Foreign residents from EU-
countries were thus able to participate in the most recent local elections which took place in 
October 2000. To be able to participate, they had to register as voters in advance. For 
Belgians voting is compulsary. Non-EU citizens, however, were not allowed to vote in the 
local elections. A special clause in the constitution stipulated that the electoral laws could 
only be modified in order to enfranchise third country nationals after the year 2001. The 
electoral law has been been modified in 2004, following a heated political debate, which 
brought the government very close to a crisis. The next Belgian local elections are to be held 
in 2006. It will be the first election providing for the participation of third country nationals, 
albeit only as voters and not as candidates. 
 
3.D. Nationality Legislation 
 
Nationality is an essential instrument for any discussion on participation, especially political, 
since the vast majority of political rights are associated with nationality. As in most European 
countries ius sanguinis, the intergenerational transmission of citizenship, constitutes the basic 
principle of access to Belgian state-citizenship. Children born to Belgian nationals are 
automatically attributed Belgian nationality at birth. However, progressively (in 1984, 1991 
and 1999) ius soli, the acquisition of nationality due to the place of birth, has been introduced 
in Belgian citizenship law. Although the 1999 reform was supposed to allow a larger 
participation of former foreign residents in the 2000 local elections, it only had limited effect 
on the increase of Belgian voters for the October elections due to slow implementation. For 
the political participation of Belgians of immigrant origin in the 2000 local elections, the 1984 
and 1991 reforms are hence to be considered most relevant (See Part II). 
 
In 1991 the importance of ius soli in the Belgian Nationality Law was significantly enhanced. 
While in 1984 double ius soli was still linked to a voluntary act of the parent(s), i.e. a 
declaration on behalf of the child before the age of 12, it is implemented (quasi-) 
automatically from the 1st of January 1992 onwards. The new procedure is introduced for the 
so-called 'third generation immigrants': Every child born on Belgian soil from a parent also 
born in the territory, automatically (and in 1992 retro-actively) acquires Belgian nationality. 
There is, however, a 'residence' condition for the parent(s): he or she has to have been living 
in Belgium for at least five years of the ten years preceding the birth of the child. In addition, 
a new option-procedure was introduced for 'second generation immigrants' born on Belgian 
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soil. The Belgian nationality can be acquired for a child born on Belgian soil by declaration 
made by the parent(s) on behalf of the child before the age of 12. The child must have been 
staying in Belgium since birth and the parents must have been living at least ten years in 
Belgium before its birth. Belgian state-citizenship is automatically granted unless the 'district 
attorney' within two months judges the parents have other motives for applying the Belgian 
nationality for their child (for example: an improvement of the own residence status) than the 
well-being of the child. If the parents have not made (or could not make) use of this 
possibility to opt for Belgian nationality for their child born on Belgian soil, the person 
involved can him- or herself still opt for Belgian nationality between the age of 18 and 22 
(option-procedure of 1984). In addition, a new procedure was introduced allowing to persons 
(born on Belgian soil and since birth residing there) to demand Belgian nationality between 
the age of 18 and 30. Belgian nationality is automatically granted unless the 'district attorney' 
within two months judges that the applicant has an unfavourable penal record. In 2000 the 
conditions for the option-procedure were simplified. Adults born in Belgium or who have 
been living in Belgium for seven years and have a permanent residents status, can opt for the 
Belgian nationality. The ‘district attorney’ has one month time to block the acquisition of 
Belgian citizenship. 
 
In Belgium, naturalisation is discretionary. It can be refused and there is no right of appeal 
against a refusal of citizenship. Discretionary naturalisation is in essence not a right one can 
make use of but a favour which one can be granted1. This is symbolically made clear in the 
Belgian system in which naturalisation is still 'politically' decided upon by parliament. Loss of 
the old nationality is in principle not a condition to acquire Belgian nationality (albeit that 
simultaneous possession of Belgian state-citizenship in combination with possession of state-
citizenship of most other European countries is ruled out by the Treaty of Strasbourg). Since 
1996, all adults who have been residing for five years (three years if one has a refugee-status) 
can apply for naturalisation. The applicant has to fill in a form giving information about his 
income, education, knowledge of language, etc. and has to give a motivation for the 
application. In addition some Belgian people have to vow for the applicant. The 'district 
attorney' there upon has four months time to investigate the 'will to integrate' and the penal 
record of the applicant. The application is then sent to the Chamber (one of the two bodies of 
parliament) that decides if the applicant will be granted Belgian nationality. Since 2000 the 
residence requirement has been dropped to three years (and two years for refugees), the 
‘district attorney’ has one month to investigate the demand and the test of integration has been 
dropped. 
 
Box 1 – Participation rights according to main categories of newcomers 
 Type of residence permit Participation rights 
Naturalised foreigners No restriction No restriction 
Foreigners with a right of 
abode 
Renewable 5 or 1 year 
residence permit 
Right to vote in local elections 
after 5 years of residence, but 
not to stand as candidate 
Foreigners without right of 
abode 
Renewable 1 year 
residence permit 
Right to vote in local elections 
after 5 years of residence, but 
not to stand as candidate 
Undocumented None None 
                                                 
1
 Note that there exist several procedure of nationality acquisition and attribution. This is only valid for the 
procedure adjudicated by the Parliament. Non Belgians with a certain length of residence, as well as second and 
third generations, have access to forms of automatic and semi-automatic nationality attribution.  
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Immigrants and their offspring have for a long time been perceived in Belgium as workers and not 
so much as civic and political actors. However, despite this infra-civic condition, they have always 
developed forms of political activity either at the margins or outside the political institutions of the 
Belgian State ; this in order to improve their living conditions or more generally to improve their 
position in society and power relations struggles.  
 
The forms of participation of immigrant origin people largely depend on the political opportunity 
structure available at certain moments in time, namely the conditions for access to political and civil 
rights, the degree of openness of political parties and civil society associations, the electoral system, 
ec. This in turn depend on the implementation of mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion by the State 
and other civil society actors. This institutional view of immigrant active civic participation is 
dominant in the Belgian literature. As an inscreasing number of research has shown, institutional 
factors can indeed explain a large part of the conditions under which immigrants may participate in 
society. The evolution of nationality legislation, for instance, has allowed a very effective opening 
of Belgian political institutions to the multicultural reality of the country. This is also true for the 
citizenship of the European Union which has allowed EU citizens to actively participate in local and 
European elections without any nationality requirement.  
 
These institutional dynamics have been studied particularly well in the last decade. Academic 
research has documented and analysed the fact that immigrants have gradually moved from non-
State bounded to increasingly State-centric forms of participation. In the following, we will shed 
light on the most relevant research in this respect. By doing this, we will touch upon significant 
developments of the Belgian political context in its relation with multicultural issues such as the rise 
of electoral mobilisation among immigrants, the emergence of immigrant origin politicians, the role 
of social capital and associational membership, the outbreak of confrontational political 
mobilisations, etc. 
 
2. Active civic participation 
2.A. Social citizenship and active participation of immigrants as labourers 
 
In 1967 EEC-foreign workers were granted rights on equal footing with Belgians in order to 
participate in social elections (i.e. worker councils): elections within private and public 
companies of a certain size. Pressure of the trade unions led to the same opening for non-
EEC-workers in 1971 (Poncin & Wolf, 1975: 17). The right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in social elections regardless of nationality that migrants have obtained in 1971 is 
considered by the trade union to be a model. Historically, it is indeed the first arena of 
legitimate active civic participation of migrants. In this context, it is no surprise to observe 
that the same trade unions that fought for the representation rights of non Belgian workers at 
the workplace very quickly lobbied for extending similar participation and representation 
rights to local elections (Rea, 1997: 52; Jacobs, 1998: 154). Although, there is an abundant 
literature on social relations, it should be noted that there is no specific attention of Belgian 
academics for the specific position of migrant social representatives and voters. It is generally 
considered by labour market specialists that this kind of participation is more important for 
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some groups than for others. Older waves of immigration like South Europeans (especially 
Italians), have been more active than more recent immigrants. 
2.B. Associational and political participation: four doctoral research theses 
 
Although, there is some journalistic and intellectual interest for the issue of active civic 
participation of immigrants in Belgium since the seventies, academic research turned its focus 
to the subject matter in a consistent way only at the turn of the nineties. Within this strand of 
research, there are four doctoral theses which deserve specific attention.  
  
In his PhD research, Marco Martiniello (1992), echoing American and French debates led by 
authors such as Miller (1981) and Catherine Withol de Wenden (1988), was among the first 
Belgian scholar to systematically challenge the idea that immigrants were politically 
quiescent. Studying Italian elites and leaders, he showed that the lack of political rights was 
not leading to a vacuum in terms of participation. Martiniello argued that the Belgian political 
system did not only disenfranchise non nationals, but disempowered them. Articulating a 
theory of power to the case in point, Martiniello showed that Italians were politically active 
but powerless and the cause for lied in that the Belgian political system had marginalised 
identity claims in the policial sphere.  
 
Three other doctoral dissertation, two being comparative, have studied aspects of civic and 
political participation in recent years. Dirk Jacobs (1998, see also section 3.C. above) 
compared the parliamentary debate on voting rights for non State citizens in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Jacobs’ focus was on the precondition for active civic participation and 
explained how the Netherlands managed to reach a consensus on the enfranchisement which 
had as consequence to stimulate the active participation of immigrant minorities. In the 
meanwhile, he showed that Belgium, with its institutional and linguistic complexity, had been 
debating the question for more than two decades with very difficult step forwards. 
Methodologically hinged on discourse analysis, Jacobs thesis scrutinised the internal logic of 
argumentation of parliamentary actors in both countries and concluded that a shift in the 
traditional conception of citizenship was at work in both countries whereby nationality could 
not anymore be taken as an absolute requirement for local political rights and participation.  
 
Andrea Rea presented another account of the issue by looking at the links between integration 
policies and immigrant responses to them. Starting from an anthropological perspective and 
using participant observation, Rea provides in his thesis one of the finest analyses of a 
specific type of reaction, although exceptional, of second generation youth to prejudice and 
discrimination: the “race riot”.  Rea’s focus is on the 1991 events in the municipality of 
Forest.  He introduces a number of concepts developed by American scholars such as the 
notion of racialisation which helps identify the resulting context of a process of social change 
marked by symbolic exclusion, domination and inferiorisation. Racialisation is, in his view, 
the pre-condition for the outbreak of this type of reactive violence which is, however, only 
unleashed because the rioters are collectively and individually experiencing racial 
discrimination (at school, at work and with police and justice authorities), on the one hand, 
and social disadvantage, on the other hand. Drawing on social movement literature, he further 
argues that the opening of the political opportunity structure at the turn of the nineties made 
possible this confrontational repertoire of collective action. In other words, the confrontation 
between the youth and the police happened in the context of a reflux of institutional and 
political racisms in Brussels and not the converse. Rea has also shown how daily 
confrontation with the police and justice system created a deep-seated feeling of injustice 
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among his respondents. Introducing Garfinkel’s concept of “ceremonies of degradation”, he 
shed light on one aspect of a broader theme which is criminalisation. This is an issue of 
central importance in Brussels and other large cities and which impact on the active 
participation of immigrants and their offspring. 
 
In 2001, Bousetta presented the first comparative study of the political participation of 
Moroccans. Dwelling on four case-studies (Antwerp, Liège, Utrecht and Lille) in three 
different countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and France), Bousetta analysed the involvement 
of his study group in the public and political life in a contextual manner. Using the 
Bourdieusian notion of field of integration, he showed that the difference invoked by the 
classical models of integration and citizenship developed by authors such as Castles (1994) is 
overplayed. Locally, there are similar mechanisms of internal differenciation between actors 
which lead to a situation where only a minority of succesful collective actors make a 
breakthrough in local policy communities. The majority of the respondents interviewed by 
Bousetta has what he calls an infra-political type of activity. In other words, there is a sphere 
of political activity within the local fields of integration whatever the country considered 
which involve a set of actors taking positions and decisions in relation to one another and 
which are not primarily aimed at influencing the course of mainstream public policy or the 
selection of political representatives through democratic procedures. As a matter of 
consequence, Bousetta concludes that the performance of the political mobilisation of 
Moroccans in the four cities studied remains marginal and mainly introverted.  
 
These four doctoral dissertation, all using qualitative methodologies, have been expanded into 
subsequent work (See the numerous research and publications in bibliography), most of them 
by the same authors, on various aspects of the active civic and political participation of 
immigrants.  
 
2.C. Electoral participation2 
 
Until recently, academic research gave greater attention to non-electoral channels of 
participation. But considering the increasing involvement of immigrant origin citizens in 
elections since 1994, things have changed. In addition, some of the foreign residents were for 
the first time able to vote and stand as a candidate in Belgian municipal elections in October 
2000. Indeed, due to the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty non-Belgian EU-citizens 
were able to register as voters and participate in the local elections. Non-EU residents, 
however, were not allowed to vote or stand as a candidate.  
 
Although research showed that EU-citizens did not use very much their newly granted rights 
to local political participation, the October 2000 elections did constitute a landmark for the 
political participation of immigrant origin citizens, especially in the Brussels Capital Region 
(See also Rea, 2002). In the previous municipal elections, held in 1994, the participation and 
success of Belgians of non-EU foreign origin was modest. Only 14 Belgians of non-EU 
foreign origin were elected on a total of 650 local councillors for the 19 municiplaities of 
Brussels. This was already a progress since until then, the representation of immigrant ethnic 
minorities in local political life has been non-existing even in the municipaties and 
neighbourhoods where immigrant origin citizens were significantly concentrated. 
                                                 
2
 Insofar as the electoral behaviours of ethnic minorities in Regional elections is very much connected to 
linguistic power struggle, we introduce this discussion in a separate section below. 
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In October 2000, there was a remarkable increase of elected Belgian politicians of non-EU - 
mainly Moroccan – origin. As can be seen in Table 3, of 652 municipal councillors, no less 
than 90 (or 13.8 per cent) are of non-EU immigrant background. As a result, 20-25% of the 
politicians of the municipal councils in the boroughs of Brussels, Schaarbeek, St-Josse and 
Molenbeek are now of immigrant Turkish or Moroccan descent. This is quite remarkable, 
since the Belgians of non-EU-immigrant origin only make up maximum 9% of the electorate. 
After the October 2000 election, several Belgians of immigrant non-EU origin have become 
aldermen for the first time. As argued by Jacobs, Martiniello and Rea, this was the sign of a 
changing pattern of political participation of immigrant origin citizens in the Brussels Capital 
Region (2002). These authors studied the electoral success of Turkish and (mainly) Moroccan 
politicians and the poor involvement of EU-citizens in these elections. They stressed that the 
phenomenon of preferential voting for immigrant (non-EU origin) candidates which was 
already observed in in the regional election of 1995 and 1999 reappeared and even shattered 
all expectations.  
 
Table 4. Elected councillors of non-EU origin and Flemish elected councillors in the 19 
municipalities of Brussels, their percentage of the total number of elected councillors in each 
















% of Flemish 
elected 
councillors 
Anderlecht 43 7 16,3% 11 25,6% 
Auderghem 29 0 0% 1 3,4% 
Berchem 24 0 0% 7 29,2% 
Bruxelles 47 13 27,7% 8 17% 
Etterbeek 33 6 18,2% 3 9% 
Evere 31 2 6,5% 10 32,2% 
Forest 35 4 11,4% 1 2,8% 
Ganshoren 25 1 4,0% 7 28% 
Ixelles 41 6 16,6% 1 2,4% 
Jette 33 2 6,1% 7 21,2% 
Koekelberg 25 3 12,0% 5 20% 
Molenbeek 41 12 29,3% 5 12,2% 
Saint-Gilles 35 8 22,9% 2 5,7% 
Saint-Josse 27 13 48,2% 1 3,7% 
Schaerbeek 47 10 21,3% 7 14,9% 
Uccle 41 2 4,9% 0 0% 
Watermael 27 0 0% 2 7,4% 
Woluwé St-
L 
35 1 2,9% 4 11,4% 
Woluwé St-
P 
33 0 0% 2 6% 
Total 652 90 13,8% 84 12,8% 
Source : Based on calculations by ISPO-KULeuven, a patronym analysis by GERME-ULB (see Jacobs, 
Martiniello & Rea, 2002), on data of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and on data of the Flemish Community 
Commission. 
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2.D. The interconnectedness of polyethnic and multinational politics in Brussels 
 
There is a relatively large number of immigrants and ethnic minority groups living in the 
Belgian capital. The existence of ethnic minority groups has never been officially recognised 
as a reason for group differentiated rights and special representation. Ethnic minorities have 
no independent public recognition outside the dual Flemish-Francophone structure of the 
political field. Often, members of ethnic minority groups are not even individually 
incorporated in the Brussels polity, since non-nationals are not enfranchised. This will change 
in the near future. In 2006, non-Belgians will be granted the right to vote, but not to stand as 
candidates, for local elections. 
 
It is striking that there is an important difference between the Flemish and Francophone 
approach for dealing with the immigrant groups in Brussels). The Flemish (Community) 
government adheres to a model for integration of immigrants in line with multicultural ideas 
of group-based recognition–and was influenced by the former Dutch minority policy. The 
Flemish government adopted a policy framework based on the recognition of ethnic-cultural 
minority groups, with a clear preference for co-operation with (and support of) self-
organisations of immigrants.  It is thus important to note that, despite the fact that one Flemish 
in three in Brussels voted for the extreme right wing and racist party Vlaams Blok in regional 
elections, the other Flemish parties have refrained from developing a form of minority 
nationalism hostile to immigrants. Quite the contrary, there is now in Brussels a set of well 
established Flemish multicultural policies.  
 
In contrast, as in the assimilationist-republican model of France, the Walloon and 
Francophone (Community) government has not been willing to recognise ethnic categories. 
Both French speaking sub-governments are inspired to varying extents by French 
assimilationist ideas of republican integration. In the Walloon government approach, ethnic 
minorities are at best defined either as immigrants or as people of ‘foreign origin’ and the 
emphasis is on intercultural relations.   
 
It should be pointed out that the difference between the Flemish and Francophone approach 
for dealing with post-immigration issues is very much interconnected with, and instrumental 
to, strategies used by both parties as contenders in the political field of Brussels. Their 
divergent positions on integration policy allow them to protect and reinforce their respective 
positions in the multinational political arena. The Flemish Community has done substantial 
effort to woo immigrant associations in Brussels. These activities are - at least partially - 
strategic attempts of the Flemish government in Brussels to incorporate immigrant (often 
Francophone) self-organisations into its policy networks, thus hoping to strengthen the sphere 
of influence of the Flemish community within the Region of Brussels-Capital. Immigrant 
associations, of course, welcome the Flemish efforts as interesting new possibilities for 
funding and lobbying. On Francophone side, the Flemish efforts are looked at with quite some 
suspicion. It is claimed by a number of militant Francophones that assimilation of immigrants 
into French culture is in their own best interest.   
 
Favell and Martiniello (1998) have correctly pointed out that this peculiar multi-levelled 
governance situation in Brussels enables and encourages new types of immigrant 
opportunities and political voice. Indeed, immigrant associations can now - to give but one 
example - go 'shopping' for funding and influence in either the Flemish or Francophone 
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community and can strategically opt for different forms of collective mobilisation - stressing 
either ethnic identity or neutral forms of social insertion (Jacobs & Swyngedouw, 2002).  
 
The institutional structures may further lead to pathological forms of political activity and 
expression among marginalised ethnic minority groups. The observation that political 
attention - and in its wake not only temporary harsher police control but also funding 
opportunities, renovation programs, youth centres - increases after urban violence as has been 
the case after the unrest of 1991, 1993 and 1997, does not seem to be a good incentive for 
more constructive political and social forms of participation. Of course, urban violence by 
immigrant youngsters has not been a premeditated form of political activism. However, it 
should be pointed out that for instance an extreme leftist organisation systematically tries to 
cash in on local problems and enlarges every incident involving immigrants and the police. 
Nearly every incident is followed by anti-police manifestations, which, as a 'safe' recipe for 
conflict between police and youngsters, often lead to violent outbursts. In addition, an 
important segment of the Moroccan and Turkish youngsters is increasingly putting into 
question the credibility and legitimacy of (immigrant) social workers, welfare organisations 
and official channels for political demands and instead prefers to opt for confrontation with 
local authorities and violent infrapolitics (and/or involvement in criminal activities). A 
structural reason is without any doubt the earlier mentioned residential concentration of 
Moroccan and Turkish youngsters in disfavoured neighbourhoods with high unemployment 
figures and little hope for short term socio-economic revival. In order to tackle this problem, 
both Flemish as Francophone authorities support initiatives aimed at sustaining the 
(re)development of disfavoured neighbourhoods. These programs, however, only very slowly 
lead to major improvements. The situation in the disfavoured neighbourhoods, where often 
over 40% to 50% of the inhabitants is disenfranchised because they are foreign residents, has 
been one of the main reasons for antiracist lobbying in favour of enfranchisement of non-
nationals.  
 
The interconnectedness of multinational and polyethnic politics, however, also (re)produces 
problems of exclusion and non-representation of immigrant groups. This has particularly been 
the case in the debate over local enfranchisement of foreign residents. In earlier work by 
Jacobs (1999) it has been shown how polarisation had transformed that debate into an 
electoral struggle over the anti-immigrant vote in the 1980s and early 1990s. It was only in the 
second half of the 1990s that the Flemish-Francophone cleavage gained importance in the 
matter (Jacobs, 1998). Constrained by a European directive on the matter and urged by a 
judgment of the European Court of Justice, Belgium did in the end grant local voting rights to 
EU citizens in 1999. The constitution had been changed in 1998 allowing to equally 
enfranchise third country nationals from 2001 onwards, but attempts to change the electoral 
law and effectively grant local voting rights to all foreign residents failed in 2002, only to 
succeed in 2004. In both cases, the Francophones increasingly supported enfranchisement of 
foreign residents, while the Flemish delayed any policy changes. Proposals for 
enfranchisement of all non-nationals were taboo for the main (Flemish) actors in the political 
field, fearing a white back-lash and further success of the racist party Vlaams Blok. This was 
for instance the main argument of the leading government party of the Flemish right-liberals 
to veto enfranchisement of non-EU foreign residents early 2002 (and once again in 2004 – the 
latter time unsuccessfully). The Flemish resistance to enfranchisement of (even European) 
foreign residents was at an earlier stage, however, equally linked to a twofold set of external 
issues: the political representation of Francophones in the Flemish periphery of Brussels on 
the one hand, and the political representation of Flemish within the regional and municipal 
institutions of Brussels on the other hand.  
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In both cases, the entire Flemish argument relies on the implicit hypothesis that the foreign 
(European) vote would benefit straight away to French speaking political actors and that 
Flemish politicians would weaken their electoral positions in Brussels and its periphery. It is a 
public secret that Francophone politicians shared these views and regarded maximal extension 
of the local electorate, although presented as a sacred universal principle, as a weapon in the 
conflict between the two communities. The debate over local enfranchisement of EU- and 
non-EU-citizens has thus become an issue in the power struggle between the two linguistic 
communities. 
 
One can wonder how founded the Flemish fears about imminent electoral success of the 
Francophones, in case of enfranchisement of foreign residents, are. Predictions by Bousetta & 
Swyngedouw (1999: 120-127) have been confirmed that the effect of EU-enfranchisement is 
very diverse and local. Moreover, participation of EU-citizens was so low (Jacobs, Martiniello 
& Rea, 2002), it hardly had any effects in Brussels and its periphery. Undoubtedly the overall 
majority of foreigners in Brussels will vote for Francophone parties. French is, after all, the 
lingua franca and the most likely language foreigners would (decide to) pick up. Since the 
overall majority of the Belgian electorate votes Francophone as well, it is, however, hardly 
certain if the political presence of the Flemish in Brussels would automatically be effected in 
a negative way in case all foreigners went to vote. In municipalities where 85 per cent of the 
Belgian inhabitants now vote for Francophone lists, a situation in which only 75 per cent of 
the foreign residents would vote Francophone, could even improve the situation of the 
Flemish. Positive campaigning of the Flemish within foreign communities – for instance 
stressing the Flemish multicultural model - could help them strengthen their positions. It 
could well be, however, that the negative position some Flemish political actors have taken in 
the debate in the past will turn their fear into a self fulfilling prophecy; foreign voters will not 
vote for political parties which have tried to keep them disenfranchised. In any event, 
whatever the electoral scores of the Flemish on the municipal level may be, there will be no 
direct consequences for the rights of the Dutch speaking in Brussels since these are protected 
in the constitution. The Flemish, however, fear the Francophones will increasingly question 
these special minority rights if the political presence of the Flemish decreases. A comparable 
logic applies to the problematic of the Flemish periphery of Brussels, although the power 
relations Flemish-Francophones are vice versa there. The Flemish will not accept that the 
Flemish status of these municipalities will be further put into question if Francophone parties 
win even more local political importance due to foreign votes.  
 
In both cases, the situation in Brussels and the situation in the periphery of Brussels, the 
resistance of the Flemish to enfranchisement of the foreigners boils down to defending the 
power and positions of the Dutch speaking. Enfranchisement is said to disrupt the existing 
system of checks and balances between Flemish and Francophones which ultimately is the 
basis for the federal structure of the country.  
 
Bousetta & Swyngedouw (1999: 115) have correctly pointed out that it is striking that the 
same arguments have not been put forward explicitly in debates over acquisition of state 
citizenship. It is nevertheless clear that, especially in Brussels, there will be an increasing 
importance of the so-called new Belgians (people of foreign origin who acquired citizenship 
through ius soli, option or naturalisation) among the electorate. Martiniello (1998: 138) has 
estimated that already in 1996 there were about 35,500 Belgian voters of foreign non-EU 
origin in Brussels, thus constituting 6,6 per cent of the electorate. It is clear that a large 
majority of these new Belgians are likely to be Francophone voters. To explain why the 
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debates over acquisition of state citizenship in the 1980s and early 1990s did nevertheless not 
become an issue in the power struggle between the two linguistic communities, Bousetta & 
Swyngedouw (1999) have put forward some plausible reasons. They have suggested an 
interesting institutional explanation, referring to the fact that only once Belgium had become a 
true federal state, it made sense to see the idea of group differentiated rights as a stake (Ibid.: 
118). In addition, they have pointed out the importance of the difference in salience and social 
impact of enfranchisement on the one hand and acquisition of nationality on the other hand. 
The former is a measure immediately affecting a large group, the latter is a more gradual 
measure which apparently is judged to be less threatening (Ibid.: 118).  
  
In any event, in the wake of the ardent debates between Flemish and Francophones over 
enfranchisement in the late 1990s, both groups increasingly became aware of the increasing 
electoral importance, especially in Brussels, of the new Belgians in the upcoming 1999 
national and regional elections. At the end of 1998 and 1999, the Flemish Community 
(Commission) in Brussels openly wooed immigrant organisations by inviting all interested 
spokespersons to extraordinary sessions in parliament. On Francophone side, the right-liberal 
party PRL, which had before been a party with moderate anti-immigrant positions, in March 
1998 attracted Mostafa Ouezekhti, a well known former Ecologist politician of Moroccan 
descent, to its party. In addition, the PRL radically transformed its positions on 
enfranchisement of non-EU-residents and on acquisition of nationality, which they would 
now ardently defend.  
 
Since ethnic minority groups will increasingly play a very important role in the (demographic) 
development of the city, they clearly constitute an important new factor in the Flemish-
Francophone divide and a potential electoral pool for individual political parties. The 
Francophone parties had already modestly taken this into consideration in the 1994 municipal 
elections and the 1995 regional elections. In the local elections of 1994, on a total of 651 
elected councillors, 14 were of non-EU origin and these were all elected on Francophone lists 
(Martiniello, 1998: 135). In the regional elections of 1995, four candidates of foreign origin 
(three Moroccan and one Tunisian) were elected into Parliament (on a total of 75 MPs), once 
again all four on Francophone lists. The Flemish parties had done no efforts to enlist 
candidates of foreign origin3. 
 
This would change in the Regional elections of 13 June 1999, coinciding with no less than 
three other elections in Brussels (European Parliament, the Chamber and the Senate). The 
Flemish socialist party SP and the Flemish ecologist party Agalev joined forces with a group 
of independent intellectuals and formed the alliance SP!Aga for the elections of the Brussels 
Parliament. On the SP!Aga-list a young women, a lawyer of Moroccan descent, Yamila 
Idrissi, was given a prominent (but not a very likely one to be elected in) 4th position. 
Moreover, several people of foreign origin, some of them clearly Francophones, took part in 
the alliance. The Flemish-right liberals VLD and the moderate nationalists Volksunie also 
joined forces in an alliance and gave a young man, a social worker of Moroccan descent, 
Fouad Ahidar, the 4th position on its electoral list. The Flemish chistian-democratic party 
CVP also incorporated candidates of foreign origin, but these were given less prominent 
positions. For the first time these Flemish parties also systematically campaigned in French in 
order to address possible Francophone (immigrant) supporters. On Francophone side, all 
                                                 
3
 Let alone journalistic accounts, there is no systematic information available on ethnic minority candidates and 
elected. This research gap will be partly closed by an ongoing research led by Dirk Jacobs, Hassan Bousetta, 
Marco Martiniello, Andrea Rea and Marc Swyngedouw which surveyed the profiles of the candidates at the 
Brussels regional election of June 2004.  
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parties (except the racist FN and FNB) included candidates of foreign origin on their lists. 
Ecolo, PS and PRL-FDF gave several candidates of foreign origin positions on their lists in 
which they would almost certainly be elected. In the neighbourhoods with high concentrations 
of immigrants, there was a very lively and intense campaign of all parties. Indeed, it was 
really only in the immigrant neighbourhoods of Brussels that one could not help noticing 
there would be elections held. It is worth noting that a lot of shops in the immigrant 
neighbourhoods had several posters of candidates of foreign origin from different political 
parties hanging in the same window. Although collections of posters of candidates of the 
same ethnic background were still predominant, there were also several shops and bars which 
had posters of candidates from different ethnic backgrounds (and different parties) in their 
windows. Indeed, street-level campaigning in immigrant neighbourhoods seemed to be both 
relying on ethnic and antiracist identities (see Cadat & Fennema, 1998). 
 
After the 1999 elections, no less than eight members of the Brussels’ parliament were of 
foreign origin. All were actually Belgian-Maghrebians (7 of Moroccan and one of Tunisian 
origin) origin. That is only three less than the Flemish representation in the parliament. The 
success of Belgians of non-EU origin is quite remarkable and constitutes a better political 
result than the Flemish politicians have achieved. The Flemish were, however, definitely not 
crowded out in the 2000 elections – contrary to what might have been expected. With 84 
elected Flemish councillors, representation is better in 2000 than in the previous 1988 (78) 
and 1994 (71) municipal elections (Mares, 1999: 340). It did occur on a number of bilingual 
lists, that Flemish candidates (with a favorable position on the list) did not get elected due to 
better preferential voting scores of Francophone Belgians of non-EU origin (holding a lower 
position on the list). Francophone candidates, however, were equally toppled by Francophone 
candidates of non-EU origin due to preferential votes – which in a number of cases led to 
internal party problems (see Jacobs, Martiniello & Rea, 2002). As is illustrated by the 
progress of Flemish councillors, it is clear that the increased presence of Belgians of non-EU 
origin has not been detrimental for the Flemish minority group. It is, however, obvious that 
there is a tricky relationship between minority representation of immigrant groups on the one 
hand and representation of the Flemish minority on the other hand. 
 
In the 2004 regional elections a number of patterns observed in earlier elections repeated 
themselves. Once again, Belgians of non-EU immigrant background played a prominent role 
in electoral campaigns and had quite some electoral success. Of the 72 Francophone member 
of parliament 17 are of non-EU origin. Among them 12 are of Moroccan origin, 2 of Turkish 
origin, 1 of Tunisian origin, 1 of Congolese origin and 1 of Guinean origin. Of the 17 Flemish 
members of parliament, one is of Moroccan origin. In addition, the growing success of 
politicians of immigrant origin was translated into executive power. A Francophone politician 
of Turkish origin (Mr Emir Kir) was appointed secretary of state in the Brussels government. 
At the same time, a lady from Brussels of Moroccan origin (Mrs Fadila Laanan) was 
appointed as Minister of French Culture, Youth and Public Broadcasting in the government of 
the French Community of Belgium, while a Brussels politician of Congolese origin was 
appointed as secretary of state for Family Affairs at the federal level (Mrs Gisèle Mandaila).  
 
 It remains an open question how the de facto political incorporation of segments of the 
immigrant community - those who have been granted or have acquired Belgian citizenship - 
on the one hand and the unavoidable debate over modes of (indirect?) representation of the 
nearly 30 per cent disenfranchised inhabitants will further affect the position of the Flemish in 
Brussels in the future. In any event, it seems to be unavoidable that the issue of political 
incorporation of ethnic minority groups, and possibly in its wake the issue of polyethnic 
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rights, will further encounter the Flemish-Francophone divide and the issue of group 
differentiated rights for the Flemish in Brussels as a companion de route. Given the newly 
guaranteed representation on the regional level from 2004 onwards, the scenario of the 
Flemish being crowded out is no longer a threat. The Flemish do, however, still run a risk of 
loosing political ground on the municipal level. In addition, appealing to the immigrant origin 
electorate remains important for both the Flemish and the Francophone political parties in 
elections of the federal level. At the local level, the Flemish do run the risk of being crowded 
out by (Francophone) Belgians of foreign origin – although this has not been the case up till 
now - and will run this risk all the more once all non-nationals will be enfranchised. As a 
result, most probably demands for guaranteed representation of the Flemish on the municipal 
level will hence keep popping up in the future. In any event, for the foreseeable future, 
creating alliances with immigrant groups will remain an important political element in the 
power struggle between the two national language groups in Brussels.  
 
2.E. Participatory frameworks for immigrants in Brussels 
 
In the seventies several municipalities in Brussels have installed advisory committees of 
immigrants. Their mission was above all informative. The advisory committees should 
provide information on the situation of immigrant communities to local councils and local 
administrations on the one hand and should provide information to the immigrants on local 
and regional administrative services. Often they were explicitely forbidden to be involved in 
(party) political activities. Constantly confronted with their limits to gaining political power 
and influence, and de facto functioning as a surrogate for genuine political rights for foreign 
residents on the local level, the advisory committees were doomed to question their own 
reasons of existence and most of them disappeared in the 1980s  (either officially or de facto). 
In 2001 the Flemish green alderman Bruno De Lille has reinstalled the local advisory 
committee in the municipality of Brussels-city.  
  
There have not only been advisory committees of immigrants on the local level, but also on 
the regional level. Shortly after its creation in 1989, the four regional assemblies of the 
Region of Brussels Capital, jointly took an interest in integration policy issues and 
participation of immigrant communities therein. The Regional parliament, the Flemish 
Community commission (VGC), the Francophone Community commission (COCOF) and the 
common Community commission (GGC) on 27th March 1990 decided to create a so-called 
'explorative' commission on immigrant issues. The commission on the one hand had to study 
possible steps which could be taken to improve relations between the regional political 
institutions and different immigrant groups in the Region and on the other hand had to look 
into what issues would have to be tackled. The commission, installed in May 1990, was given 
one year to accomplish this mission. It consisted out of 36 members of which half were 
regional politicians and the other half were representatives of immigrant or Belgian-
immigrant associations. The explorative commission finalised its report on 21st June 1991. Its 
conclusions led to a resolution adopted by the Regional parliament on 9th July 1991, in which 
the wish was stated to create a permanent mixed commission - mixed because consisting out 
of elected politicians and representatives of immigrant groups - on immigrant issues. In the 
resolution, the powers, structure and overall organisation of this future commission were laid 
down, as well as the procedures for designating the representatives of immigrant groups. In 
addition, a special Charter, the Charte des devoirs et des droits pour une cohabitation 
harmonieuse des populations bruxelloises, stipulating the ground rules for coexistence of the 
different groups in Brussels was put forward.  
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The mixed commission would essentially dispose of a consultative power. It would examine 
projects or proposals relevant to the immigrant communities and would equally be able to 
propose new initiatives. The issues the mixed commission can address and the policy fields it 
can get involved into, were explicitly stipulated in the resolution: education, employment, 
housing, living conditions, relations with the police, problems associated to non-
implementation of laws, teaching of Islam religion, local political participation, the rights and 
the position of women in society and refugees. 
  
Just like the 'explorative' commission, the mixed commission would consist out of 36 
members, half of them being elected politicians, the other half being immigrant 
representatives. All of them would have to adhere to the Charter before their installation in the 
commission. The immigrant representatives were to be designated through a special 
procedure. First, immigrant associations would be invited in the press to present their 
candidates. Then, the executives of the four regional assemblies would make a selection 
among the candidates after having consulted the 'explorative' commission. Finally, the four 
regional assemblies would approve of the list of candidates through a secret ballot.  
   
The mixed commission would consist out of an executive office and three working groups. 
The executive would consist out of twelve members; eight members of parliament (five 
Francophones and three Flemish) and four immigrant representatives. In addition to these 
twelve ordinary members, the executive would comprise two rapporteurs and two secretaries - 
all four members of parliament. The presidency and the three first vice-presidencies would be 
reserved to members of parliament, while the fourth vice-presidency would be given to an 
immigrant representative. Three working groups would look into specific issues the mixed 
commission wants to study and address. Each of these groups would consist of 12 members; 6 
members of parliament (four Francophones and two Flemish) and 6 immigrant representatives 
(four Francophones and two Flemish). One member of parliament and one immigrant 
representative have the task to prepare the policy advice of the working groups. 
  
The first mixed commission was installed on 6 February 1992. It has addressed issues as the 
new housing code, the granting of a frequency to an Arab radio for Brussels and the report on 
poverty. In response to the urban violence in Forest and St-Gilles in May 1991, the mixed 
commission decided to give special attention to the youth of foreign origin. A program was 
launched in April 1992 aiming at a ‘dialogue with the youth’. Between June 1992 and April 
1993 over 60 hearings were organised with youngsters, parents, social workers, teachers, the 
police, shop-owners and representatives of immigrant associations. The activities finally led 
to a report describing the situation of youngsters of immigrant descent in Brussels. 
  
It is worth noting that, following the 1995 regional elections, it took a while before the 
decision was taken to install a new mixed commission (29th November 1996), due to the 
reluctance of the new governmental partner PRL-FDF and linguistic difficulties. In fact, it 
was even decided that Flemish and Francophones would also create their own mixed 
commission. The Flemish mixed commission did substantial effort to woe immigrant 
associations by inviting all interested spokespersons to extraordinary sessions in parliament in 
November and December 1998. In addition, they organised a highly advertised ‘day of 
dialogue’ in March 1999 – with concerts, free food and drinks – to promote the Flemish 
community among immigrant associations.  
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2.F. Social capital, associational membership and political participation. 
 
In 1995-1996, a large quantitative survey was launched in Brussels studying immigrant 
incorporation on various dimensions including social, economic, political and linguistic 
aspects (Swyngedouw, Phalet, Deschouwer 1999). This research, based on representative 
samples of the two largest minority groups in Brussels (Moroccans and Turks4) and a 
matching sample of low-educated Belgian, helped gaining new insights into the involvement 
of minority groups in public life5. In a subsequent publication based on the same dataset, 
Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw (2004) have looked more specifically into the relationship 
between associational membership and political involvement6. Their aim was to evaluate the 
validity of the thesis advanced by Fennema and Tillie in the international literature which 
holds that differences in political participation between groups can be explained by different 
levels of ‘ethnic civic community’, and more specifically by differences in social capital 
(including participation in associational life).  
 
In this article, Jacobs, Phalet, Swyngedouw offered a nicely elaborated quantitative analysis 
of the link between associational involvement and political participation. Indeed, the survey 
included items asking the respondents to report on their active membership of a list of 
voluntary organisations. Active membership was defined in the study as ‘having participated 
in one or more activities of an organisation over the last year’. In both ethnic minority 
samples, a distinction was made between perceived ethnic (Turkish or Moroccan) and cross-
ethnic (Belgian or mixed) types of organisation.  
 
The comparison of the overall participation rates revealed striking differences along ethnic 
lines between a very active Turkish community, a somewhat less active working-class 
Belgians, and a much less active Moroccan community in Brussels. Table 1 is reproduced 
from this study and indicates the total proportion of respondents who participated in 
organisations. The percentage figures in brackets indicate the proportion of participants in 
more than one organisation. Over two-thirds of the Turks (68 per cent) are found to 
participate in one or more organisations7, compared to half of the Belgians (52 per cent) and 
one-fifth of the Moroccans (19 per cent).   
 
Table 5  Participation of Turks, Moroccans and Belgian nationals in ethnic and cross-ethnic 
organisations in Brussels (per cent) 
 Belgians Turks Moroccan
s 
Cross-ethnic participation 
(Belgian or mixed organisations) 
 60 (10) 17 (6) 
Ethnic participation 
(Turkish or Moroccan organisations) 
 35 (10) 10 (6) 
Total participation 52 (22) 68 (23) 19 (9) 
Source: Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw 2004 
 
                                                 
4
 Aleatory samples among all adults of Moroccan and Turkish nationality who do not hold Belgian citizenship 
5
 The sample of low-educated ethnic Belgians was chosen to have a ‘fair’ comparison in which education is kept 
constant. 
6
 Participation in churches, sports clubs, leisure associations, etc, is indiscriminately included in the data. 
7
 Those who are active in more than one organisation are mentioned between brackets 
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Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw found that not only are both Turks and Moroccans more 
often active in Belgian or ethnically mixed organisations than in ethnic forms of organisation, 
but those Turks and Moroccans who are more active in ethnic organisations are also more 
likely to participate in the activities of cross-ethnic organisations. They also looked at the 
types of organisation in which ethnic minorities and working-class Belgians are mostly active 
(Table 6). Percentages in the table indicate the total proportion of respondents who 
participated in given types of organisations. The percentages in brackets indicate the 
proportion of respondents participating in more than one organisation. 
 
Table 6  Participation of Turks, Moroccans and Belgian nationals in various types of 
organisation in Brussels (per cent) 
 Belgians Turks Moroccans 
Political or interest representation 
(trade unions, parties) 
29 (2) 59 (3) 11 (2) 
Service organisations (educational and 
recreational) 
30 (1) 25 (9) 11 (5) 
Voluntary associations (religious, 
neighbourhood) 
12 (1) 20 (3)   7 (3) 
Social movement organisations (anti-
racism, women) 
  9 (1)   2 (1)   4 (1) 
Source: Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw 2004 
 
There can be little doubt that ethnic minorities and Belgians alike invest mostly in 
conventional political representation: 59 per cent of Turks, 29 per cent of Belgians and 11 per 
cent of Moroccans participate in political parties or trade unions, especially in the major 
Christian-Democrat and Social-Democrat Unions. The latter finding suggests that entrenched 
consociational politics in Belgium are still the most significant representational channel of the 
working class, including Turkish migrants and, to a lesser extent, the Moroccan minority (cf. 
Bousetta 2000).  
 
In the infrapolitical sphere, service organisations also play an important role: 30 per cent of 
Belgians, 25 per cent of Turks and 11 per cent of Moroccans are actively involved in 
educational or recreational organisations such as sports or youth clubs. In contrast to 
participation in representational and service organisations, direct participation in voluntary 
associations is rather limited, except for the relatively high Turkish participation in mosque 
associations: 20 per cent of Turks, 12 per cent of Belgians and 7 per cent of Moroccans are 
active in religious or local neighbourhood associations. Participation in social movement 
organisations is marginal: only 9 per cent of Belgians, 4 per cent of Moroccans and 2 per cent 
of Turks mention participation in the activities of anti-racism or women’s movements. To 
sum up the arguments of Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw: overall the picture is quite clear in 
the sense that Turks are more active than Moroccans in associational life. This pattern 
consistently holds after controlling for gender and education. (See more elaborate discussion 
in Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2004) 
 
The authors go on to test the argument of their Dutch colleague Fennema and Tillie. The latter 
suggest an link between ‘civic ethnic community’ and political involvement at the aggregate 
level. In line with their claims, and given the fact there is in Brussels higher levels of (ethnic) 
membership among Turks than among Moroccans, we should expect to find more political 
involvement among Turks than Moroccans. In reality, however, there is no significant 
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differences between the two groups in Brussels and, when they exit, they point to the converse 
result. 
 
To monitor political involvement of ethnic minority groups in Amsterdam, Fennema and 
Tillie (1999) used a so-called ‘political participation scale’. The Brussels survey 
(Swyngedouw et al. 1999) did not contain the same scale for political participation, but there 
were a number of items which served as alternatives. As an index of democratic participation, 
in the absence of formal voting rights for (non-EU) foreign nationals, 2000), the Brussels 
survey asked Turkish, Moroccan and working-class Belgians about their informal political 
activities. Table 7 reproduces the results of Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw by presenting the 
average score on three relevant items. 
 
In their Amsterdam research Fennema and Tillie (1999) also make use of a number of 
questions related to political interest. In the BMS, a more or less comparable three-item scale 
of interest in Belgian politics was constructed. Table 8 shows the average score of political 
interest for the three groups. It can be noted that for all three groups political interest is fairly 
highly correlated with (informal) political participation.  
 
Table 7  Mean score on informal political participation scale for Turkish, Moroccan and 
lower-class Belgian men and women 
Ethnic group Men Women Total 
Belgians 2.40 2.47 2.43 
Turks 2.76 2.07 2.42 
Moroccans 2.74 2.12 2.49 
Source: Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw 2004 
 
Table 8 Mean score with regard to political interest for Turkish, Moroccan and lower-class 
Belgian men and women 
Ethnic group Men Women Total 
Belgians 3.42 3.16 3.30 
Turks 3.27 2.43 2.86 
Moroccans 3.43 2.61 3.10 
Source: Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw 2004 
 
All in all, Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw concluded that there were no significant 
differences between Moroccans and Turks with regard to informal political participation. 
With regard to political interest, Turks were less interested than Moroccans. This is contrary 
to what was anticipated if the Brussels’ situation had been in line with Fennema and Tillie’s 
hypotheses. The study did not reveal anything about formal political participation, since non-
EU nationals at the time of the survey did not have any voting rights. However, it is worth 
noting that Belgians of Moroccan origin have been very successful in local and regional 
elections while this has not been the case for Belgians of Turkish origin (see previous 
sections). This adds to the general picture that in Brussels it is definitely not the Turks who 
are most politically involved. The link Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001) suggest between 
‘civic ethnic community’ and political involvement is not reflected in the Brussels data at the 
aggregate level. 
 
The Brussels survey also allowed to study the link between participation in associational life 
and political involvement at the individual level. The idea was to test whether it is correct that 
(ethnic) associational membership is an incentive to political involvement. However, the 
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authors equally wanted to take into account important potential explanatory factors such as 
gender, education, language proficiency and employment status in order to manage to rule out 
spurious effects. For doing so, the authors used multiple linear regression of which we will 
only give the final results (Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw 2004). 
 
Gender has an important role in explaining political participation among Turks. Women have 
significanyly less chance to show informal political participation. Education seems to play no 
role, but knowledge of the French language does constitute a factor in stimulating political 
participation among Turks. For Turks, unemployment does not hinder informal political 
participation; on the contrary. Ethnic membership has some positive effect on informal 
political participation, while cross-ethnic membership has no effect whatsoever. Trade-union 
membership has a positive effect on informal political participation.(See Jacobs, Phalet & 
Swyngedouw 2004) 
 
As was the case for Turks, Moroccan women have less chance of informal political 
participation than Moroccan men. While education shows no influence, knowledge of French 
has a very important predictive value for Moroccans. In contrast to the Turks, unemployment 
is detrimental for informal political participation of Moroccans. Ethnic membership has a 
positive effect, but this effect almost totally disappears when we control for trade union 
membership. Ethnic membership thus only has a positive effect in combination with trade 
union membership, while trade union membership appears to be in itself a strong incentive of 
informal political participation of Moroccans. Cross-ethnic membership (outside trade unions) 
has no significant effect.  
 
For Turks, knowledge of French appears to be important in explaining political interest. 
Moreover, women have significantly less chance to show political interest than men. There is 
a minor positive effect of unemployment and a small effect of education for Turks in showing 
more political interest. Membership has no significant role whatsoever. Among Moroccans, 
women again are shown to have less opportunity to show political interest than men. 
Knowledge of French is extremely important, while education has a smaller effect. 
Employment status is of no importance. There is no direct influence of ethnic membership nor 
of cross-ethnic membership. There is, nevertheless, a positive stimulus from union 
membership and an indirect effect of ethnic membership through union membership to be 
seen among Moroccans. 
 
In sum, irrespective of the social capital issue, language proficiency is unmistakably a very 
important element to be taken into account in explaining political involvement in Brussels. 
The ability to speak French seems to be a crucial factor for political involvement of both 
Turks and Moroccans. It is consistently (one of) the most important independent variable(s) in 
the models developed by Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw. This being said and without going 
into a detailed interpretation of all the findings, there is a positive link between ethnic 
membership as such and political involvement for both Turks and Moroccans. For Moroccans 
ethnic social capital seems to be a stimulus for political involvement through cross-cultural 
social capital. Different effects are found among Turks. Apparently, ethnic social capital does 
not have the same effects on political involvement in both minority groups. As a consequence, 
different levels of ethnic membership within the two ethnic minority groups cannot explain 
different levels of political involvement of the ethnic minority groups under study. The 
‘(ethnic) civic community’ argument of Fennema and Tillie on its own can therefore not help 
to explain differential levels of political involvement of Moroccans and Turks in Brussels. 
However, this does not mean that social capital has no importance at all in explaining patterns 
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of political involvement. Cross-ethnic membership, as a particular form of social capital, does 
help to explain differences in political involvement within the Moroccan and Turkish groups 
in Brussels. Ethnic membership is not totally without a positive effect for political 
involvement of Moroccans, but it operates indirectly through the positive effect of cross-
ethnic membership. For Moroccans, cross-ethnic membership has a positive influence in itself 
on political involvement, as does ethnic membership combined with cross-ethnic 
membership. These findings do not seem, however, to help in explaining differences in 
political involvement between the Moroccan and Turkish groups in Brussels. The results add 
strength to the theoretical argument that a distinction should be made between ‘ethnic’ social 
capital (embedding in ethnic associations) and cross-cultural social capital (embedding in 
mixed and more mainstream organisations). Furthermore, one needs to look into the way 
these are interrelated.  
 
Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw concluded that the Fennema and Tillie hypotheses do not 
work in a straightforward way for Brussels. Although there is a high score of Turks on a 
number of indicators of ‘ethnic civic community’ – including a strikingly high association 
membership level among the Turks – in comparison it is the Moroccans who have a higher 
level of political involvement. Moreover, at the individual level, there is no proof of a strong 
positive link between membership participation in ethnic associations as such, on the one 
hand, and political involvement on the other. Furthermore, links that can be found do not 
really help us to explain differences in political involvement of Moroccans and Turks at the 
aggregate level. Indeed, ethnic social capital has different effects on political involvement for 
Moroccans and for Turks.  
 
This does not, however, mean that looking at social capital has no explanatory value for 
political involvement of ethnic minority groups. There was, for instance, a positive link 
between cross-cultural membership participation and political involvement in both groups 
under study. In addition, for Moroccans, there is a positive influence of ethnic membership on 
political involvement through cross-cultural membership. One should thus make a distinction 
between ‘ethnic’ social capital (embedding in ethnic associations) and cross-cultural social 
capital (embedding in mixed and more mainstream organisations) and take into account to 
what extent any influence of ‘ethnic’ social capital is related to cross-ethnic social capital. 
Moreover, the effect of ‘ethnic’ social capital can play out differently for different groups.  
 
On the basis of these observations, the authors also concluded that differences in political 
involvement between Moroccans and Turks are to be seen in the light of differential ties of 
Moroccans and Turks with Belgian mainstream society and related differential political 
opportunity structures. Language was identified as an important factor in this process. First of 
all, one can remark that language proficiency of French, the most important political language 
in Brussels, is higher among Moroccans than among Turks (French was one of the colonial 
languages of Morocco). Secondly, we see that language proficiency in French is an important 
element in enhancing political involvement. Moroccans thus are more likely to get politically 
involved than Turks. For both groups not only French language proficiency but equally cross-
cultural associational ties to mainstream society seem to be an important incentive for 
political involvement. Nevertheless, ethnic associational life does not seem to be an obstacle 
for Moroccans for political involvement. Indeed, membership of ethnic associations, through 
parallel membership of cross-ethnic associations, stimulate their political involvement.  
 
 32 
2.G. Confrontational politics and the rise of Islamic poltitical parties 
 
Belgium has faced several outbreak of political violence by young people of immigrant 
origin. This happened essentially in Brussels in 1991, 1993 and 1997, as well as in Antwerp 
in 2001. In all these occurences, the central actors were young people of North African 
(essentially Moroccan) origin. These events have been studied by several authors who 
emphasised the role of discrimination, the logic of criminalisation by police and justice 
authorities, the alarmist media construction of the events, as well as the role of political 
opportunity structures (See Rea, 2001). However, even though immigrants of North African 
origin and their offspring have steadily increased their political representation within Belgian 
assemblies since the first outbreak of violence in 1991, confrontational politics has not faded 
away and has taken on an increasingly Islamic identity-profile.  
 
The move from the North African, or simply immigrant, identity-repertoire to the Islamic one 
is an important transformation favoured by post the 09/11 context. For a long time, Muslims 
qua Muslims have been relatively invisible as public and poltical actors, even though they had 
intense infra-political activities inside their ethnic boundaries. Since a few years, islamic 
religious parties using confrontational politics have appeared on the Belgian politicl scene. To 
date, these parties have not been able to gain a seat in any election. 
 
The party Noor is one of the first attempts in this direction. The party, based in Brussels, has 
not been able to push forward candidates in all the elections and has not been very succesfull, 
but it has managed to maintain some organisational internal dynamic. Noor competed in the 
general election of 1999 and 2003 at the First Chamber but were absent from the local 
election of 2000. In 1999, the party obtained 1.240 votes (0,15%) in Brussels and less in the 
general election of 2003 (1.141 votes). 
 
The Party for Citizenship and Prosperity, stemming from the Movement of Young Muslims, 
succeeded in its first electoral participation in May 2003 to gain 8.258 votes (0,98%). The 
party is essentially composed of converts and is based in Brussels. It obtained its best results 
in the municipalities with high concentration of immigrant people from the Islamic world. 
Would the party reiterate this result in the next local election of 2006, it would be in a position 
to achieve one or more seats in some municipalities in Brussels.  
 
The case of the party Resist, stemming from the Arab European League of the charismatic 
protest leader Abou Jahjah, is somewhat different than the two others. The party is a merger 
of the Arab European League, initially a civil right/antidiscrimination voluntary assocation, 
and the extreme left party PVDA (Partij van de Arbeid: Labour Party). At its first 
participation to the general election of May 2003, Resist obtained 17.000 votes in the Senate 
(0,27% in Flanders and 0,84% in the province of Antwerp). At the Chamber, it obtained 
10.000 votes (0,6%) in Antwerp. Considering the media coverage of its leader, Abou Jahjah), 
the result of Resist was not convincing according to most observer (Jacobs 2004, Bousetta and 
Swyngedouw 2004). This is what led Abou Jahjah to reorient its political profile and to create 
a Moslim Democratic Party in 2003. The objective of the Party is to gain one or more seats in 
the local election of Antwerp in 2006. 
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2.H. Political racism and inter-minority group antagonism 
 
Beyond prejudice and discrimination facing minorities of immigrant origin, racism manifest 
itself also at the political level in the form of ideology. During the seventies and eighties, 
immigrants in Brussels were a particular target of extreme-right propaganda. A study by de 
Biolley (1994) analyses the extent of ideological racism during the political campaigns in 
Brussels before the local elections during the period 1970-1988. She observed that racist 
rhetorics was far from being solely produced by extreme-right parties. Politicians belonging 
nearly to all parties have succumbed to the tenmptation of wooing the racist vote. With the 
emergence of ethnic minority people in local and regional politics after the mid nineties, the 
extent of racist political discourses among traditional democratic parties has diminished. But 
the extreme-right and a number of marginal lists has gone on playing the racist card at every 
elections since then. As shown by Swyngedouw (1992, 2003), anti-immigration attitude was 
and remains a key component of the extreme-right vote in both Brussels and Flanders. 
 
It is worth noting that due to the fragile institutional architecture of the Brussels region, the 
extreme-right do not only pose a threat to immigrant and ethnic minorities, but to the whole  
institutions of Brussels. Considering that the Region of Brussels is dependent on dual 
majorities within both the Francophone and Flemish part of the assembly, there has been a 
serious risk for Brussels institutions to be blocked if the Vlaams Blok was in a position to take 
control of a majority of seats in the Flemish group of the regional assembly. Had the Vlaams 
Blok been able to secure 9 seats in the regional election of 20048 (6 in the 1999 election), it 
would have been able through the double majority system to make impossible the formation 
of a new government.  
 
In light of the electoral results of the Vlaams Blok in both Brussels and Flanders, ideological 
racism, and the racial violence it has led to, is likely to remain high on the academic agenda.9 
In addition to this enduring issue, Brussels is faced with an emerging question of racism, 
which is not anymore played out in the context of majority-minority domination. Since the 
beginning of the second Intifada at the Autumn of 2000, there are indications that intergroup 
antagonism between minorities has taken on new dimensions. This is what the media and 
other academic observers have labelled the ‘importing of the Israëli-Palestian conflict’. 
Antisemitic attacks have been reported in several parts of the country but mainly in Brussels 
and Antwerp. Young Moroccans have been taken in public debates, among others in several 
statements by Jewish leaders, to be the main perpetrators of this outbreak of anti-semitic 
violence. While it is clear from an even cursory field exploration that anti-Jewish feelings and 
prejudice have dramatically increased within the Muslim community at large, the police has 
hitherto failed to bring the perpetrators before the courts. This has, on the one hand, created a 
climate of downright suspicion against the Muslim community in the increase of anti-semitic 
violence and, on the other hand, an amalgamation of the Belgian Jewish community with 
Israeli State violence in the Middle East. This new configuration of mutual prejudice and 
stereotype between minority groups themselves does not leave the majority unaffected. The 
current context is marked by collective attempts to provoke moral indignation of the public 
opinion whereby both Jewish and Muslim communities are readily portraying themselves as 
the victims of the antisemitism/Islamophobia produced by the other community. The whole 
                                                 
8
 The total number of seats for Flemish parties in 1999 was 11 and was brought to 17 through the system of 
guaranteed representation in 2004. The Vlaams Blok won 6 seats in 2004 and 4 in 1999. 
9
 In 2001, a Moroccan family was killed by a Vlaams Blok supporter and a young professor of Islamic studies 
was assassinated in Antwerp by a racist neighbour. 
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point in the debate is actually to maximise symbolic profits through what Chaumont has aptly 
called a competition of the victims (Chaumont 1997). 
 
2.I. Participation and rights associated to the institutional recognition of worship 
 
Although religion is not directly related to the legal status of foreign residents, it is worth 
addressing the issue in the context of immigration. Indeed, immigration of foreign residents 
led to a further diversification of the religious field in Belgium, particularly with the advent of 
Orthodox Churches and Islam. Thus the issue of rights and participation in the religious field 
is indirectly linked to the legal status and the citizenship rights of foreign residents. 
 
The Belgian policy approach to religious diversity is quite original. It hinges on a small 
number of constitutional rules which provide the institutional armature of the whole system. 
The first rule consist in establishing the basic principle of the freedom of worship (article 19). 
The second rule provides that individual citizens must not be restricted in their religious 
choices, and, therefore, are free to change their affiliation (article 20). The third article in the 
Constitution dealing with worship is about the neutrality of the State in its relations with 
religions (article 21). This latter article provides that the State is impartial and must not 
interfere with the internal organisation of religious groups. This framework is complemented 
by the article 181 of the Belgian Constitution which provides that the salaries and pensions of 
clergymen, as well as those of recognised secularist delegates, are paid by the State. 
 
In Belgium, the principle of secularism is not tantamount to a radical breach between State 
and religions. What has been historically at work is a form of secularism grounded on the 
concept of the neutrality of the State vis à vis the internal organisation of religions. Although 
the Belgian system reflects the very liberal conceptions of the 19th century, the place of 
religions in the public domain has never gone undisputed. The argument goes that a form of 
ambiguity exists inasmuch as the legislation, and in particular the Law of 4 March 1870 on 
the management of the temporal aspects of religions, refers to the concept of ‘recognised 
religions’. Indeed, the State commits itself to provide a financial contribution to a number of 
worships, which have received beforehand an official agreement of both the Parliament and 
the government. Whereas the Parliament has jurisdiction over the granting of the label of 
‘officially recognised religion’, the government is competent alone for the crucial aspect of 
organising the procedure in practice. This latter stage involves the recognition of a chief 
interlocutor (meaning that decentralised churches have to unite or federate) and the 
subsidiation as foreseen by article 181 of the Constitution. Six religious groups have hitherto 
received the official agreement from both the Parliament and government. These are the 
Roman Catholic, the Protestant, the Anglican, the Israelite, the Orthodox and the Islamic 
religions. 
 
The sociological transformation brought about by the post-war labour migration and the new 
migration (post-1974) contributed to reopen the debate about the place of worship in the 
public space. The public debates about the recognition of the orthodox and Islamic religions 
are two examples of this reality. It is in 1985 that the Orthodox Church received the official 
recognition from the Parliament, after the two dominant branches of the Orthodox religion, 
the Greek and the Russian Orthodox Churches, had federated administratively. The debates in 
Parliament shows that the recognition of the Orthodox Church did not raise any political 
opposition. The story of the Islamic religion is more complex and involves a great deal more 
political contention. In 1974, Islam received unexpectedly the official recognition from the 
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Parliament. The law of 19 July 1974 was indeed voted in the context of the oil crisis and in 
parallel to bilateral negotiations between Belgium and Saudi Arabia on oil contracts. This 
sudden progress on the parliamentary level has not been put into concrete form until 1999. 
This very long delay was due to the extreme difficulty encountered by both Muslim 
communities and the Belgian government to let emerge and recognise a representative head of 
the Islamic religion. The decision taken by the Belgian federal government on 3 May 1999 is 
bringing the issue of the recognition of the Islamic religion close to an end. However, it is 
worth summarising the stages this issue has gone through as it indicates the difficulty of 
making a place for Islam within the public domain. 
 
After a long indecisive period, the issue of Islam has surfaced anew on the headlines in 1989 
in the aftermath of a series of events including the Rushdie Affair, the headscarf affair and 
more dramatically the killing in the heart of Brussels of the Director of the Islamic and 
Cultural Centre of Belgium. In this context, the Royal Commissioner for Immigrant Policy, 
once again, endeavoured at unlocking the public debate by proposing the establishment of a 
High Council for Muslims. This proposal did not receive much support and was eventually 
rejected. However, the debate proceeded and, in July 1990, the government established a 
preparatory wisemen committee in charge of proposing a final solution for the organisation of 
the temporal aspects of Islam. In October 1991, the wisemen committee ceased its activities 
without any results.         
 
From 1993 till 1996, representatives of the Muslim community entered into unobtrusive 
negotiations with the Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Ministry of Justice with the plan 
of cutting the Gordian knot of the recognition of Islam. The 3rd of July 1996, the government 
gave the mission and the material means to a group of representatives of the Muslim 
community, known as the Muslims Executive of Belgium, to prepare the setting up of a Chief 
Organ for Islam. This preparatory work lead to the decision of going through a democratic 
procedure and to organise elections among the Muslim community all over the Belgian 
territory. The election took actually place on the 13th of December 1998. The outcome is that 
an assembly of 51 persons has been elected and 17 persons were selected through co-optation. 
The assembly agreed on the selection of 16 members who are composing the Executive 
Office. Through the governmental decision of 3rd May 1999, the Executive Office has been 
recognised as Chief Organ and official interlocutor of the State for the management of 
temporal issues linked to the Islam faith (Islamic education, subsidisation of mosques, salaries 
of imams, etc).  
 
In 2003, internal conflicts within the assembly led to the appointment of a new executive 
board which received an institutional recognition from the State for a year. It eventually 
proved impossible to find a consensus between this board and the government for the renewal 
of the assembly from which the Executive is selected. Faced with this new difficulty, the 
Parliament voted on the 20th July 2004 a law establishing an electoral commission in charge 
of renewing the assembly and the Executive. The process is under way and a new election is 
expected on March 20th 2005. 
 
2.J. Prominent figures of immigrant origin 
 
Before concluding this overview of the Belgian landscape concerning the active civic 
participation of immigrant and their offspring, we wish to present a selection of prominent 
figures in public life (Box 2). Such a selection is not easy and involves some subjectivity. 
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Among the five persons selected here, we have included 3 mainstream politicians. This should 
come as no surprise. As we have emphasised throughout the report, Belgium has made a 
tremendous breakthrough in terms of including immigrants in the political process. And as it 
is made clear, immigrant origin politicians now occupy very significant political positions at 
the governmental level. Anissa Temsamani was the first to enter the federal government in 
July 2003 before she resigned a few months latter. Both Fadila Laanan and Emir Kir have 
been seconded at their turn in sub-State governments and they are currently the most visible 
immigrant origin politicians. Dyab Abou Jahjah is also a politician of immigrant origin. As 
Laanan, Temsamani and Kir, he has been actively involved in politics, but one of a more 
confrontational nature than the former. He set up in Antwerp a radical civil right movement in 
the city of Antwerp which made him appear on the headlines of no less than the New York 
Times. Our final selection is Hadja Lahbib, the first Maghrebian women to present the 
evening news on the French speaking national television. As a final point, it is worth noting 
that 3 of our 5 examples are women and this is probably not the result of a biased perception. 




Box 2. Some prominent figures of immigrant origin in Belgian public life 
Fadila Laanan Minister Culture, Youth and public broadcasting of the French 
Speaking Community and first person of non EU origin 
seconded as ‘Minister’ in July 2004 (Moroccan origin) 
Anissa Temsamani Member of Parliament, former Secretary of State and first 
person of non EU origin seconded in the federal governement 
(Moroccan origin) 
Emir Kir Secretary of State in the Brussels Regional Government, since 
July 2004 (Turkish Origin) 
Dyab Abou Jahjah Civil right/anti-discrimination activist involved in 
confrontational political action in Antwerp, leader of the Arab 
European League (Lebanese origin) 
Hadja Lahbib First journalist of immigrant origin to present the evening 




Part III: Conclusion 
 
 
Immigrants and foreigners are active in all fields of society, ranging from politics, science, 
arts, journalism, etc. Over the last fifteen years, they have become increasingly visible in 
public life by actively engaging in public debates around issues of direct concern to them. 
According to quantitative survey research in Brussels, one has to conclude that the degree of 
active civic participation of immigrants differs according to the ethnic group considered. 
Turks are generally more active than low-skilled Belgians and low-skilled Belgians are more 
active than Moroccans (Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw 2004). Turkish origin citizens are the 
most active within both self-organisation and cross-ethnic organisations. However, as far as 
electoral politics is concerned, Moroccan origin citizens have been more succesful than any 
other immigrant group including Europeans.  
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As shown throughout this report, Belgian academic research have well documented these 
issues. However, there remains a number of research gaps to be filled in. The first concerns 
the study of voter preferences. To date, no reliable exit-poll has ever been conducted in order 
to assess how immigrants and ethnic minorities vote. There are many indirect indicators, but 
no firm knowledge. The second concern recently arrived communities. Although significant 
knowledge has been produced about minority communities whose members had immigrated 
during the sixties and seventies as workers, like Moroccans and Turks, there remains a 
significant gap concerning the civic attitudes and behaviours of smaller and/or more recently 
arrived communities such Central and Eastern Europeans, South Asians, Chinese, etc. There 
is at this level a research gap that will need to be addressed by future research. 
 
 
In many respects, the Catholic Roman Church remains in a very advantageous situation both 
symbolically and materially. The long and troublesome process which eventually lead to the 
recognition of Islam is also illustrative of the ambiguity of the relations between the Belgian 
State and religions. For 25 years, Islam has been maintained in an unfair position in 
comparison to other religions. Beyond that, it is actually the whole philosophy of the 
legislation which is under increasing pressure. Shouldn’t we consider indeed that the legal 
recognition of a given religion maybe discriminatory vis à vis others unrecognised religions? 
What are the criteria for distinguishing between a religion, a philosophical movement, and a 
sect? Should State funding take into consideration the size of each religious group or should it 
allow individual citizens to dedicate a share of their tax-income to the philosophies and 
religions of their choice? These are certainly among the issue which will need to be addressed 
in the future and which will gain momentum with the increasing religious diversity associated 
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Centre of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
Université de Liège (ULg) - Faculté de Droit - Science Politique  
7 Boulevard du Rectorat, Bât. 31, Boîte 38 - 4000 Liège (Sart-Tilman), Belgium 
Tel : +32 (0)43 66 30 40 
Fax : +32 (0)43 66 45 57 
http://www.ulg.ac.be/cedem 
 
Director: Marco Martiniello – M.Martiniello@ulg.ac.be 
Researcher: Hassan Bousetta - Hassan.Bousetta@ulg.ac.be  
 
The CEDEM, created in 1995, is an interfaculty centre which aim is to carry out 
theoretical and empirical research in the fields of human migrations, ethnic 
relations and racism. Among others, the Centre is interested in the relations 
between migration processes and uneven development. These researches are led 
in a pluri-disciplinary perspective: political science, sociology, anthropology, 
international relations, law, etc. 
 
Groupe d'études sur l'Ethnicité, le Racisme, les Migrations et l'Exclusion 
(GERME)  
Institut de Sociologie – Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) 
44 avenue Jeanne, 1050 Brussels, Belgium 
Tel : +32 (0)2 650 31 82 




Director: Andrea Rea – area@ulb.ac.be 
Researcher: Dirk Jacobs - dirk.jacobs@ulb.ac.be 
The Group of studies on ethnicity, racism, migration and exclusion has been 
created in 1995. It carries out research in various fields such  european 
dimension of migration policies, public and social policies  for migrants or 
population of foreign origin, citizenship, social integration (education and 
employement) and political participation of migrants.  
Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek Opinieonderzoek (ISPO) 
Institute of Social and Political Opinion Research 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KULeuven) – Departement Sociologie 
2B E. Van Evenstraat  – 3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Tel: + 32 (0)16 32 30 50 




Director: Jaak Billiet – Jaak.Billiet@soc.kuleuven.ac.be 
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Researcher Director: Marc Swyngedouw – 
Marc.Swyngedouw@soc.keuleuven.ac.be 
The Institute of Social and Political Opinion Research (ISPO) was founded in 2002 
and it is the successor and extension of the 'Interuniversitair Steunpunt voor 
Politieke-Opinieonderzoek' (created in 1990). The research areas of the ISPO 
now are fourfold: election studies, research on minorities, value and value 
change studies, and methodology of quantitative and qualitative research. The 
ISPO has both a quantitative and qualitative focus. In every of the ISPO research 
projects scientific social theories are considered by using the most up to date 
research methodology 
2. Civic participation: 
 
Departement Politieke Wetenschappen –  
Department of Political Science 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KULeuven) - Faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen  
2B E. Van Evenstraat - 3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Tel: +32 (0)16 32 32 50 
Fax: +32 (0)16 32 30 88 
http://www.soc.kuleuven.ac.be/pol 
 
Researcher: Marc Hooghe - marc.hooghe@soc.kuleuven.ac.be 
The research of Political Sociology focuses on the central institutions and 
processes of decision-making, inherent in contemporary democracies. Therefore, 
four major domains are central in the research-strategy of the Section: elections, 
political parties and social organizations, parliaments and governments. In the 
analyses and publications both structural and cultural determinants of the 
functioning of democracies and its patterns of decision-making are taken into 
consideration, as well as recent dynamic developments along with the analysis of 
their historic roots. In this respect the Belgian political system is a privileged 
domain of research, especially from the perspective of comparative research.  
Onderzoeksgroep TOR 
Group of Research 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) 
2 Pleinlaan– 1050 Brussel, Belgium 








CEDEM (see point 1) 
 
Centre interdisciplinaire d’études de l’islam dans le monde contemporain 
(CISMOC) - Centre for Interdisciplinary Research on Islam in 
Contemporary World (CISCOW) 





Director : Felice Dassetto – dassetto@anso.ucl.ac.be 
Researcher: Brigitte Maréchal – marechal@anso.ucl.ac.be 
The Centre for Interdisciplinary Research on Islam in Contemporary World aims 
to promote research at the UCL on contemporary Islam in increasing the value of 
existing research, in starting from these resources and in making these 
convergences, since they are scattered to various departments and domains. 
Centrum voor Islam in Europa (CIE) 
Centre for Islam in Europe 
Universiteit Gent (Ugent) - Dpt. Wijsbegeerte & Moraalwetenschap,  
2 Blandijnberg - 9000 Gent, Belgium 
http://www.flwi.ugent.be/cie/CIE 
 
President: Sami Zemni – sami.zeni@Ugent.be 
Director: Herman De Ley – herman.deley@Ugent.be 
Research Project Director: Jan Blommaert – jan.blommaert@Ugent.be 
Inaugurated in 1998, the CIE works at giving Islam in our secular society a 
respected academic status, while developing scientific and educational tools for 
combating present-day islamophobia and racism. It stands for an 
interdisciplinary and scientific approach and is acting independently of all 
partisan interests.  
The CIE intends to: a) co-ordinate and disseminate already available knowledge, 
skills and information; b) mobilize financial resources to conduct policy-oriented 
research in support of a more harmonious and fair institutionalization of Islam in 
our secularized society; c) build an academic forum for Muslims and non-
Muslims; d) stimulate Muslim youngsters to enter academic studies, while 
demanding respect for their Islamic identity and e) develop proposals for 
renovating the scientific study of Islam; support the creation of academic 
curricula in Islamic sciences and theology, which enjoy the approval of the 
Muslim communities. 
COSMOPOLIS City Culture & Society  
Centre for Urban Research - Vrij Universiteit Brussel (VUB) 
VUB-room 6F332 
2 Pleinlaan – 1050 Brussels – Belgium 
Tel: + 32 (0)2 629 33 79 
Fax: + 32 (0)2 629 33 78 
cosmopolis@vub.ac.be 
http://www.cosmopolis.be 
Eric Corijn - eacorijn@vub.ac.be 
Walter De Lannoy - wdlannoy@vub.ac.be 
 
GERME – ULB (see point 1)  
 
Hoger Instituut voor de Arbeid (HIVA ) 
Higher Intitute of Labour Studies 
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Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KULeuven) 
Research sector Sustainable Development  
47 Parkstraat - 3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Tel: +32 (0)16 33 20 75 




Head of the Research sector Sustainable Development: Patrick Develtere – 
patrick.develtere@hiva.kuleuven.ac.be 
Research manager of Migration research: Johan Wets – 
johan.wets@hiva.kuleuven.ac.be 
 
The Higher Institute for Labour Studies (HIVA) is a research institute founded in 
1974. One of its sectors of research activities is Sustainable Development which 
focuses on 4 research areas: environmental policy, sustainable development and 
social participation, international cooperation, and migration research.  
 
The migration research concentrates on the sub-themes of international 
migration and migrants, with attention being given both to the causes and 
consequences of international migratory movements. This places the subject in 
an explicit North-South context. The theme is approached from the perspective 
of various policy domains: international cooperation, the labour market, social 
welfare, security, etc. In addition to the process, the people involved in the 
process are also studied, independent of their legal category. This research group 
seeks to achieve three objectives with these studies: improving knowledge of the 
dynamics of migration, the trends and migration patterns at national, European 
and global level; gaining a better insight into the relationship between policy and 
migration patterns at the various levels; and devising a better conceptual 
approach to international migration. The focus lies mainly, though not 
exclusively, on policy. 
 
Institute for Social and Economic Geography (ISEG) 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KULeuven) – Faculty of Science 
42 W. de Croylaan - 3001 Heverlee, Belgium 
Tel: +32 (0)16 32 24 43 
Fax: +32 (0) 16 32 29 80 
http://www.kuleuven.ac.be/geography/iseg 
 
Head of the Research Unit: Etienne Van Hecke - 
etienne.vanhecke@geo.kuleuven.ac.be 
Researchers: Chris Kesteloot – Chris.Kesteloot@geo.kuleuven.ac.be 
Herman Van der Haegen – Herman.VanderHaegen@geo.kuleuven.ac.be 
 
The research undertaken at the Institute for Social and economic geography 
covers the whole of social and economic spatial patterns and processes in 
Belgium. These topics are the subject of historical, present-day and prospective 
analysis. The Institute developed a very strong expertise in handling statistical 
data, mainly on the level of the municipalities and the statistical sectors. The 
construction and analysis of databases, the use of different classification and 
analysis methods (ex multivariate analysis, cluster analysis, spatial analysis, 
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auto-correlation ...) and cartography (by GIS or DTM) make part of this know-
how.  
 
ISPO – KULeuven (see point 1) 
 
Institute of Political Sociology & Methodology (IPSoM) 
Katholieke Universiteit Brussel (KUB) 
17 Vrijheidslaan – 1081 Koekelberg, Belgium 
Tel: +32 (0)2 412 42 11 
Fax: +32 (0)2 412 42 00 
http://www.kubrussel.ac.be/onderwijs/psw/onderzoek/ipsom.htm 
 
Director: Marc Swyngedouw – marc.swyngedouw@kubrussel.ac.be 
Researcher: Dirk Jacobs – dirk.jacobs@kubrussel.ac.be 
The Institute of Political Sociology & Methodology was founded in 1994 and aims 
to do quantitative as well as qualitative multivariate research on socially relevant 
topics, relying on a combination of a strong methodological and theoretical basis. 
In each of IPSoM's research projects; substantial social scientific theories will be 
investigated by using the most up to date research methodology. To achieve 
this, IPSoM set out two social theoretical research lines (minority studies and 
election studies) and one methodological research line.  
Onderzoeksgroep Armoede, Sociale Uitsluiting en de Stad (OASeS) 
Research Group on Poverty, Social Exclusion and the City 
Universiteit Antwerpen (UA) - Faculty of Political and Social Sciences 
13 Prinsstraat - 2000 Antwerpen, Belgium 
Tel: +32 (0)3 220 41 11, +32 (0)3 220 41 12, +32 (0)3 220 41 13 




Directors: Jan Vranken – Jan.Vranken@ua.ac.be  
Luc Goossens – Luc.Goossens@ua.ac.be 
Project manager on Migration and Ethnic Minorities: Christiane Timmerman – 
Christiane.Timmermann@ua.ac.be 
 
The more prominent research topics of the centre include: poverty and other 
forms of social exclusion (poverty indicators, the daily life of the poor, life events 
and social mobility), migrations and ethnic minorities, urban policy, social 
housing, social economics and supported employment, social networks. The 
research is carried out from two perspectives: it studies the mechanisms of social 
exclusion and it focuses on the relationships between the social and the spatial 
dimensions of society. 
 
The group’s interest in migration and ethnic minorities dates back to the 1980s. 
This research line was consolidated within OASeS at the end of 1997 through the 
integration of the research group on ‘Migration and Health’ of the Prince Leopold 
Institute of Tropical Medicine in Antwerp. The available research expertise is a 
kaleidoscope of various topics and approaches: fundamental or applied, policy-
oriented; qualitative or quantitative; sociological or multidisciplinary research.  
 
